Persons and Family: COMPILED REPORT: Persons and Family Relations

CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

[Republic Act No. 386]

AN ACT TO ORDAIN AND INSTITUTE THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Be enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

COMPILED REPORT

As of September 10, 2018

SUBMITTED BY:

Abad, Lance Joseph

Capio, Kristia

Gumangol, Janine May T.

Ramos, Richard
Ramos, Lacky Charlie

Teope, Evita

Viray, Noel

Estabillo, Venancio C.

Villanueva, Rose Ann C.

Valencia, Aneleth Anjolyn B.

(JD - 1A Students)

SUBMITTED TO:

Judge Princess Bustos Ongkeko

(Professor)

PRELIMINARY TITLE

Chapter 1

EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS

Article 1. This Act shall be known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines." (n)

[By: Lance Joseph Abad]

Concept of Law

Law in its general sense (derecho), is defined as the science of moral laws based on the rational nature of man, which governs his free activity for the realization of his individual and social ends, and which by its very nature is demandable and reciprocal.

In its specific sense (ley), it is defined as a rule of conduct, just, obligatory, promulgated by legitimate authority, and of common observance and benefit.

Concept of Civil Law

Civil law is defined as the mass of precepts which determines and regulates those relation of assistance, authority, and obedience existing among members of a family as well as among members of society for the protection of the private interests.

Concept of Civil Code.

A Civil Code is defined as a collection of laws, which regulates the private relations of the members of civil society, determining the respective rights and obligations, which reference to persons, things and civil acts.

Sources of the Philippine Civil Code.

The source of the Civil Code of the Philippines are the following:

(1) Civil Code of Spain of 1889;

(2) Codes and laws of other countries, such as Spain, the various States of the United States of America, like California, France, Argentina, Mexico, Switzerland, England and Italy;

(3) Judicial decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, of the U.S.A., Spain and other countries;

(4) Philippine laws or statutes such as the Code of Civil Procedure (Art. No. 190), the Rules of Court, the Marriage Law (Act. No. 3613), the Divorce Law (Act. No. 2710), the Family Code (E.O. No. 229, as amended by E.O. No. 227), and the Inter-Country Adoption Law (R.A. No. 8043);

(5) Works of jurists and commentators of various nations;

(6) Filipino customs and traditions; and

(7) The Code Commission itself. (See: Report of the Code Commission, pp. 2-3)

Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. (As amended by E.O. No. 200).

[By: Kristia Capio]

SUMMARY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200

CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

SECTION 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the “Civil Code of the Philippines,” and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SECTION 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette.

Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.

RULES ON EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS

As amended by Executive Order No. 200 the provisions of Article 2 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines, a law shall take effect on the sixteenth day. For the matter that in the counting a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day shall be included.

The phrase “unless otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity not the publication. The phrase does not dispense with publication. Subsequently, if a law provides that it shall take effect immediately, there is still a need for its publication. It can likewise provide that it shall take effect one year after its publication like the effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Due process goes with the requirement of publication. It is because; if a law takes effect without it being published it would amount to a lack of due process. Once published the people are presumed to have knowledge of the law, even if they have not read it. Presumptive knowledge is adequate and actual knowledge is not essential for as long as the people obey with it as a rule of conduct.

COVERED BY THIS RULE ARE:

Presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature. Also, naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting an individual from certain prohibitions or requirements.

Administrative rules and regulations if their purpose is to implement existing law according also to a valid delegation.

The circulars issued by the Monetary Board if they are meant not only to interpret but to “fill in the details” of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to implement.

The charter of a city although only applies to a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place.

EXEMPTED BY THIS RULE ARE:

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.

The Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in the petitions for adoptions or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms.

Municipal ordinances also are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

EFFECTIVITY OF THE CIVIL CODE:

The Supreme Court said that the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect on August 30, 1950, one year after its publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such decisions of the Supreme Court on the effectivity of the Civil Code have been criticized in that what the law provides is that the Civil Code of the Philippines shall take effect one year after the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette. Records showed that it was published in June 1949, however, the Editor of the Official Gazette certified that the publication was released for circulation on August 30, 1949. It has been said that if the basis for computing the one-year period is the date of publication, the effectivity is June 30, 1950.

Case:

LORENZO M. TAÑADA v. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915. April 24, 1985

ESCOLIN, J.

FACTS:

Petitioning the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners sought a writ of mandamus against respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

However, respondents contended that publication in the Official Gazette is not an essential requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. Since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law becomes valid and enforceable.

RULING:

Yes. Article 2 of the Civil Code does not stop the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The objective was to give the general public adequate notice of the several laws which are to control their actions and conduct as citizens. Also, without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat.” Because it would be unfair to punish or burden a citizen for the wrongdoing of a law of which he had no notice, not even a constructive one.

Article 3. Ignorance of the Law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

[By: Janine May T. Gumangol]

Basis of Rule

It is based upon the assumption that evasion of the law would be facilitated and the successful administration of justice defeated if persons accused of crimes could successfully plead ignorance of the illegality of their acts.

Reason

“If ignorance of the law can be excused as a defense when one violates it, there would be disorder in society, criminality would happen everywhere.”

Why the law proscribes ignorance of law as defense?

If ignorance of the law is valid, then anyone can evade criminal liability and civil liability that he does not know the law.

Presumption of Knowledge of Law

Everyone is conclusively presumed to know to know the law even if the people have no actual knowledge of the law.

They are presumed to know it after publication.

Presumption of Knowledge of Law

Everyone is presumed to know the Law, even if the people have no actual knowledge of the law.

They are presumed to know it after its publication.

Ignorance/Mistake of Fact

May excuse a party from the legal consequences of his acts or conduct, but not ignorance of the law.

Ignorance/Mistake of Law

Is a defense that the criminal defendant misunderstood or is ignorant of the law.

Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. (3)

Concept of retroactive or retrospective law.

[By: Richard Ramos]

A retroactive or retrospective law is one which looks backward or contemplates the past; one which is made to affect acts or transactions occurring before it came into effect, or rights already accrued, and which imparts to them characteristics, or ascribe to them effects, which were not inherent in their nature in the contemplation of law as it stood at the time of their occurrence (Black on interpretation of Laws, 380). Although this is the generally accepted definition of the term ( Keith v. Guedry, 114 S.W. 392; Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199, 8 Am. December 52), used by and in courts in a wide and general sense; however, in discussions concerning the constitutional validity of particular statutes, and in relation to constitutional prohibitions against the enactment of retrospective law generally, the term is taken in a somewhat narrower sense, and applied to laws which take away or impair the obligation of contracts, or which create a new obligation, impose a new duty, or attach a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past ( Sturges v. Carter, 114 U.S. 511, 5 Sup. Ct. 1014, 29 L. ed. 240). But a statute cannot properly be called retrospective merely because a part of the requisites for its operation may be drawn from a time antecedent to its passage ( Queen v. Inhabitants of St. Mary, 12 Q.B. 120 ), nor because its operation may in a given case depend on an occurrence anterior to that date ( In re Scott, 126 Fed. 981).

Prospective operation of laws.

It is a rule of statutory construction that all statutes are to be considered as having only a prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the lawmaking body give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used ( Ancaja v. Jacosalem, 24 Phil. 220). The universally accepted rule is that a Constitution, as any other statute, has no retroactive effect except when it so expressly provides, and the Constitution of the Philippines certainly does not do so, much less if it affects vested rights ( Espiritu v. San Miguel Brewery, et al., Phil. 615). In case of doubt in this regard, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect ( In Re Riosa, 39 Phil. 23).

Usury laws prospectively construed; consideration of prior occurrences permitted.

Usury laws, ordinarily, are to e construed prospectively and not retrospectively. Nevertheless, the courts may look into prior occurrences in order to understand the particular fact which is claimed to be a violation of the law, and in order to ascertain the criminal intent ( U. S. v. Tan Quineo Chua, 39 Phil. 552).

Exceptions to the rule of prospectivity.

1. Penal laws favorable to the accused

Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of the Penal Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. And the provisions of this article ( Art. 22 of RPC), are applicable even to special laws which provide more favorable condition to the accused.

2. Penal laws when retroactive; requisites; example

If the law is penal in nature, it can be given retroactive effect provided that the same is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual delinquent or a recidivist. So that even if the law is penal in character, but it is not favorable to the accused, it cannot be given retroactive effect.

3. Retroactivity of penal laws.

In People v. Patalin, et al., G.R. no. 125539, July 27, 1999, 109 SCAD 734, accused were charged with the crime of robbery with multiple rape in 1984. In 1987, when the Constitution suspended the imposition of the death penalty, the trial has not yet been finished, hence, it was overtaken the Death Penalty Law effective January 1, 1994. If the accused are convicted, can the death penalty be imposed upon them?

The Supreme Court said no and went on to say that before the 1987 Constitution, death penalty as a capital punishment could be imposed on certain heinous crimes like robbery with rape ( Art. 294, RPC). From 1987, however, until the passage of the death penalty law or on January 1, 1994, the imposition of death penalty was suspended. In case of the three convicts, an issue came up regarding the imposition of death penalty because when they committed the crime in 1984, the death penalty was still in our statutes books; but the trial of the case was overtaken by the 1987 Constitution and then later on y the new death penalty law. So, when judgment was finally rendered finding them guilty, the death penalty had been suspended and then reimposed again. The issue they raised therefore was: Can the Court impose the death penalty on them?

Of course no.Art.22 of the revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor a person guilty of a felony who is not habitual criminal, although at the time of the publication of such law a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

A statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offence committed against the state. The provision of the Constitution on the abolition of the death penalty is penal in character since it deals with the penalty to be imposed for capital crimes. This provision may be given retroactive effect during three possible stages of a criminal prosecution: (a) when the crime has been committed and the prosecution begins; (b) when sentence has been passed but the service has not begun; (c) when the sentence is being carried out.

So there is no doubt that the abolition of the death penalty y the Constitution retroactive affected and benefited the convicts. Perforce, the subsequent reimposition of the death penalty will not affect them. The framers of the Constitution themselves state that the law to be passed by Congress reimposing death penalty can only have prospective application.

There is no question that a person has no vested right in any rule of law which entitles him to insist that it shall remain unchanged or repealed, nor in any mission to legislate on a particular matter. However, a subsequent statute cannot be applied retroactively as to impair a right that accrued under the old law. Clearly, the convicts’ right to be benefited by the abolition of the death penalty in the 1987 Constitution accrued or attached by virtue of Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code ( People v. Patalin, et al., G.R. 125539, July 27, 1999, 109 SCAD 734).

4. Remedial and procedural statutes

Laws have no retroactive effect except when they refer to a matter of procedure or is passed for the sake of convenience, and does not affect substantial rights ( Aguillon v. Dir. Of Lands, 17 Phil. 506; Montilla v. Agustinian Corp., 24 Phil. 220). Except in case of remedial statutes and those which relate to procedure in the courts, it is a general rule that acts of the Legislature or Congress will not be construed as to make them operate retrospectively, unless the law making body has explicitly declared its intention that they should so operate, or unless such intention appears y necessary implications from the nature and words of the act so clearly as to leave no room for a reasonable doubt on the subject. The reason for this rule is the general tendency to regard retrospective laws as dangerous to liberty and private rights, on account of their liability to unsettle vested rights to disturb the legal effect of prior transactions. Having in mind this reason it was thus held in a case that laws procedural in nature may operate retrospectively ( Guevarra v. Laico, 64 Phil. 144). Likewise, it was held that statutes making changes in remedies or procedure are within the discretion of the Legislature or Congress and are valid as long as they do not infringe vested rights.

5. Special express mandate of law

When a new act expressly provides that it shall have retroactive effect, and no constitutional question is involved, then the law is given its retroactive or retrospective effect ( Gov’t. of the Phil. V. Standard Oil Co., 20 Phil. 30). It is also given a retroactive effect when that effect is necessarily implied from its language or is necessarily intended. For instance, Commonwealth Act no. 682, commonly known as the People’s Court Act, passed on September 25, 1945, and purposely intended and aimed at giving a speedy trial of political offenders who were detained by the Commander-In Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States in the Philippines.

6. Statutes Creating a new rights

The principle that new law shall not have retroactive effect only governs he rights arising from acts done under the rule of former laws but if the right be declared for the first time by subsequent law it shall take effect from that time even though it has arisen from acts subject to the former law, provided that it does not prejudice another acquired right of the same origin.

7. Curative statutes

The term “Curative Statues”, refer to those which undertake to cure and irregularities in judicial or administrative proceedings, and which are designed to give effect to contracts and other transactions between private parties which otherwise would fail of producing their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or the failure to comply with some technical requirement ( Mc Surely v. Mc Grew 140 lowa, 163, 118 N.w. 415).

8. Constitutional consideration on ex post facto law and on a bill of attainder

An ex post facto law is one which makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal and punishes such action; or which aggravates a crime, or make it greater than it was when committed or which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender. A Bill of Attainder is a legislative act which convicts persons of and punishes them, for, crimes without judicial trial. It declares the blood of such person corrupted and devoid of all heritable quality. Attainder is extinction of civil rights and capacities which takes place whenever a person who has committed treason or felony receives sentences of death for his crime.

9. Statutes impairing vested rights

When the effect of giving to a statutes a retrospective construction would be to make it destroy or impair vested rights, such construction will be avoided, and the statutes will be held to apply to future acts and cases only, provided, that this can be done by any reasonable interpretation of the language used by the legislature.

10. Statutes imposing penalties and liabilities

A statutes imposing a new penalty or forfeiture, or a new liability or disability, or creating a new right of action, will not be construed as having a retrospective operation, if such consequences can fairly be avoided by interpretation.

11. Prospectivity of doctrinal rulings

In a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms, the accused admitted he had no license or permit but claimed to be entitled to exoneration because he had an appointment as secret agent from the PC Provincial commander, said appointment expressly authorizing him to possess and carry the firearm. He contended he was entitled to acquittal because at the time he possessed the firearm (1964) the doctrine then in fore was that laid down in People v. Macarandang ( 1959), 106 Phil. 713, and People v. Lucero 9 1958), 103 Phil. 500. The trial court convicted him, on the ground that this doctrine had been abandoned in the 1967 case People v. Mapa 9 20 SCRA 1164).

12. Family Code is retroactive

As a rule, acts executed against mandatory or prohibitory laws are void, except when law itself allows their validity. Marriage laws are mandatory and prohibitory, such that if the marriage is contracted where one of the parties is psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties to the marriage bond, the marriage is void ( Art. 36, Family Code); but the law recognizes as legitimate, a child born or conceived out of such marriage, provided that the child is conceived or born prior to the declaration of nullity of the marriage 9 Art. 54, Family Code). If a married woman marries before the lapse of 300 days after the death of her husband, the marriage is valid, but the Revised Penal Code penalizes her.

Article 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory and prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity.

[By: Lacky Charlie Ramos]

What is Mandatory Laws and Prohibitory Laws?

MANDATORY LAW/S - are statute, which contains word of command, which a person has no choice but to obey.

Example: Constitutional Rights

Bill of Rights- An accused must be inform his/her rights (Miranda Doctrine).

That are, imperative and impose a duty upon those covered by the law. Generally, the laws which contains the words "Shall" or "Must". Is one which prescribe element/s as a requirement.

Example: Deed of Donation

The element of this is it "must be written" in the dialect "known by the stater".

Any acts contrary to the Mandatory Laws shall be void, unless there is/are exception in the law. Or simply "DO THIS".

Case:

Bernardino Marcelino vs. Fernando Cruz, Jr.

G.R. No. L-42428 March 18, 1983

FACTS:

Mr. Marcelino was charged for the crime of rape. Presenting of evidences against him were finished last August 4, 1975. On the same date, attorneys of both parties moved for time within which they submit their Memoranda. Judge Fernando Cruz Jr. gave 30 days, (equivalent to 1 month) to submit their Memoranda. Only part of Mr. Marcelino had submitted his Memoranda. Judge Cruz Jr., filed his decisions with the clerk of court last November 28, 1975 but the promulgation of the decision was scheduled on January 1976. Upon knowing of Mr. Marcelino the schedule of promulgation, he states that, the lower court has no longer promulgate the decision due to the lapsed of 90 days given to a lower court to render decisions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, Judge Cruz Jr. had resolved a case within 90 days given to a lower court to render decisions;

HELD:

YES, in section 15. It says that all cases or matters filed after the effectivity of the constitution must be decided or resolved within 24 months from the date of submission for the Supreme Court, 12 months for all lower collegiate courts and 3 months for the lower courts. Judge Cruz Jr. submitted his decision with the clerk of court on November 28, 1975 which was five days before the 3 months rule of the lower courts.

PROHIBITORY LAW/S - Are those which contains positive prohibitions and are couched in the negative term importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated.

Laws that imposes duty to refrain from doing a forbidden act. Generally, they use the phrases “shall not,” “must not,” or “may not.”

Any acts contrary to Prohibitory Law/s shall be void, unless when there is/are exception in the law.

Or simply "DO NOT DO THIS".

Example:

A, the owner of a restaurant, obtained loan to B (lending constitution). As a security, A rendered the title of the restaurant to B. A and B signed a contract stating that if ever A did not pay his/her loan, B will take the possession of the said restaurant even without foreclosure proceeding. A did not able to pay for his/her loan, B took the possession of the said restaurant and months later, B sold the restaurant to C.

Acts of B shall be void. In Article 2088 of the civil code, The creditors cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge or mortgage or dispose them. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void.

Article 2088 is one of the provisions of Prohibitory Law/s.

Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to third person with a right recognized by law. (4a.)

[By: Richard Ramos]

Waiver defined.

Waiver is the relinquishment or refusal of a known right with both knowledge of its existence and an intention to relinquish it ( Portland &F.R.Co. v. Spillman, 23Or. 587;32 Pac.689).

When is there a waiver?

In practice, it is required of everyone to take advantage of his rights at a proper time; and neglecting to do so will be considered as a waiver. Thus, failure of councel, either in brief or oral argument, to allude to an assignment of error, is a waiver thereof ( american fibre-Chamois co. v. Febre Co.,72Fed. 508, 18 C.C. A, 662).

In contracts, if after knowledge of a supposed fraud, surprise, or mistake, a party performs the agreement in part, he will be considered as having waived the objection ( Bro. P. C. 289;11 B. L.D. 3418).

If the knowledge of the existence of the insurance, contrary to the terms of the contract, the defendant insurance company elects to continue the policy in force, its action amounts to a waiver of the right of cancellation ( Gonzales Lao v. Yek Tong Lin fire, et. Co., 55Phil. 386).

There are matters of procedure which under the rules of court are matters that are waivable or fall within the discretion of the courts. For instance, venue of action may be waived ( Manila Railroad v. atty. Gen., 20 Phil. 523).

Rules of evidence which merely protect the parties during trials may be waived by them. Thus, a contract of insurance requiring the testimony of an eyewitness as the only evidence admissible concerning the death of the insured person is valid. Likewise, a contract waiving the privilege against the disclosure of confidential communications made by a patient to a physician is valid.

The right of the accused to preliminary investigation is personal one and may be waived, expressly or by implication. The right of the accused to be present at certain stages of the proceedings may be waived; so also may his right to the assistance of councel ( U.S v. Go-Leng, 21 Phil. 426; U.S. V. Kilayko, 31 Phil. 371; U. S. v. Escalante, 36 Phil. 743).

Scope of waiver.

When a constitutional provision is designed for the protection solely of the property rights of the citizen, it is competent for him to waive the protection, and consent to such action as would be invalid if taken against his will.

In criminal cases this doctrine can be true only to a very limited extent. ( Cooley, Const. Lim 219).

The right of waiver while extending to almost all descriptions of contractual, statutory, and constitutional privileges is nevertheless subject to control of public policy, which cannot be contravened by any conduct or agreement of the parties. Accordingly, all agreements will be held void which seeks to waive objections to acts or defenses illegal at law ( Boutelle v. Melendy, 19 N.H. 196;49 Am. December 152; Rosler v. Rheen, 72 Pa. 54), or which are forbidden on the ground of morality or public policy ( Green v. Watson, 75 Ga. 471, 473; Am. Rep. 479).

Waiver distinguished from ratification

Ratification is the adoption of a contract made on one’s behalf by some one whom he did not authorize, which relates back to the execution of the contract and renders its obligatory from the outset. Waiver is the renunciation of some rule which invalidates the contract, but which, having been introduced, for the benefit of the contracting party, may be dispensed with at his pleasure ( Reid v.Field, 83 Va.26, S. E. 395).

Waiver, being mixed question of law and fact, it is the duty of the court to define the law applicable to waiver, but it is the province of the court or the jury to say whether the facts of a particular case constitute waiver ( Nickerson v. Nickerson, 80 Me. 100, 12Astl. 880). Thus, if a minor enters into a contract, the same can be ratified by the parents or guardians. Such act of parents or guardians shall cleanse the contract of its defect from the commencement of the contract of the minor ( Art. 1396, NCC).

General rule and exceptions on waiver of rights

The general rule is that rights may be waived. But this rule is not absolute. It admits two exceptions, such as:

a. When the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs; and

b. When the waiver is prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

An example of a waiver of right which is contrary to public policy and morals is the situation in Cui v. Arellano University, L-15127, May 30, 1961. A student was granted scholarship but agreed not to transfer to another school, unless he would refund all the benefits he derived out of his scholarship. The Supreme Court said that this is void.

The ruling in Cui v. Arellano University is consistent with Article 1306 of the civil code where the parties to a contract are given the liberty to stipulate on its terms and conditions, provided the same are not contrary to law, public policy, public order, morals and good customs. Furthermore, Article 1409 of the Civil Codes states that contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy are void.

Future Inheritance

Waiver of future inheritance is void. That is contrary to law. This is specially so if the waiver or repudiation is intended to prejudice creditors, Hence, under Article 1052 of the Civil Code, if an heir repudiates inheritance to the prejudice of his own creditors, the latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir. The acceptance is to the extent of their credit.

Political Rights

Political rights cannot be the subject of waiver. If a candidate for mayor agrees to split his term of office with the vice mayor to prevent the latter from running against him, that contract is void by the reason of public policy. In fact, the constitution says that a public office is a public trust. It is not a property it is beyond the commerce of man, hence, it cannot be the object of a contract, otherwise, it is void ab initio.

Waiver contrary to law

In Leal v. IAC, G. R. No. L-65425, November 5, 1987, a contract of sale with right to repurchase was entered into by the parties with a prohibition against selling the property to any other person except the heirs of the vendor a retro. This was held to be void because it is contrary to law. It amounts to a perpetual restriction on the right of ownership.

Waiver of rights

In Sanchez, et al. v. CA, et al., G. R. no. 108947, September 29, 1997, 87 SCAD 463, there was a waiver contained in the compromise constituting a relinquishment of a right to properties owned by the decedent which were not known. In contesting the validity of such waiver, it was contended that the same is contrary to morals, law, and public policy.

In upholding the validity of such waiver, the Supreme Court said that the assailed waiver pertained to their hereditary right to properties belonging to the decedent’s estate which were not included in the inventory of the estate’s properties. It also covered their right to other properties originally belonging to the spouse Juan Sanchez and Maria Villafranca Sanchez which have been transferred to other persons.

In addition, the parties agreed in the compromise to confirm and ratify said transfers.

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the court declares a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders, and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.

[By: Evita Teope]

This article asserts the supremacy of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land over an ordinary law or legislation, administrative or executive acts.

There are sources of Law in order of preference in this Article:

• The Constitution

• Laws (Presidential Decrees)

• Administrative or executive acts, orders, and regulations

Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. It is to be presumed that the lawmakers knew the older law and intended to change it. In enacting the older law, the legislators could not have known the newer one and hence, could not have intended to change what they did not know.

Non-observance of the law. The disuse, custom, or practice to the contrary does not repeal a law. Thus, although hardly enforced nowadays, an article of the Revised Penal Code still prohibits betting on the results of a basketball game, or any other sports contest.

[NOTE: Our Supreme Court, in the case of Hilado v. Collector (L-9408), held that the Philippine laws which are not of a Political character continued to be in force during the Japanese Occupation, it is a legal maxim that a law, once established, continues until it will be changed by some competent legislative power. [Therefore, our internal revenue laws, among others, continued to exist during the occupation.]

As for repealing of laws, there 2 kinds of repeal:

1. Express

A law or statute is expressly repealed if it is contained in the subsequent act or when a new law is enacted containing a provision expressly repealing an existing law.

2. Implied

When the subsequent law is inconsistent with the former, a law can be repealed by implication provided that the requisites exist:

The laws must cover the same subject matter;
There is a plain, unavoidable and irreconcilable repugnancy/inconsistency between the two.

Rules for General and Special laws:

A. In case of conflict between a general and a special law, which should prevail?

1. If both of which include and cover the same subject, or that the general law was enacted prior to the special law, the special law must be deemed an exception to the general law. (Lichauco v. Apostol, 44 Phil. 138)

Case:

Lichauco v. Apostol,

G.R. No. L-19628 (44 PHIL 138), Dec. 4, 1922

FACTS:

The Petitioner, a corporation duly organized under the Philippine laws, has engaged in the business of importing carabao and other draft animals for several years and was desirous of importing, from Phnom-Penh, a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. However, the respondent Director of Agriculture refused to admit said cattle except upon the condition that the draft cattle be immunized from rinderpest. The Petitioner, however, contends that the respondent has no authority over the matter, invoking section 1762 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3052. On the other hand, relying upon section 1770 of the Administrative Code, Administrative Order No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture, and Dept. Order No. 6 of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, respondent maintained its decision. Hence, the issue.

ISSUE:

Whether or not section 1770 (and other similar acts) has been repealed by implication by Act 3052 and hence cannot be applied with the case at bar?

HELD AND REASONING:

No. The Court ruled that the contention of the petitioner is untenable for the reason that the invoked section 1762, as amended, is obviously of a general nature while 1770 is a particular one. Section 1770 is therefore not inconsistent or repugnant with section 1762 and instead be considered as a special qualification of the latter provision. Moreover, the court emphasized that“specific legislation upon a particular subject is not affected by a general law upon the same subject unless it clearly appears that the provision of the two laws are so repugnant..xxx…The special act and the general law must stand together, the one as the law of the particular subject and the other as the general law of the land.”

Therefore, Section 1770 of the Administrative Code remains in effect and serves as a supplementary provision to section 1762, as amended.

In relation to this subject matter, we should take into account that the Civil Code repeals:

1. The old Civil Code of 1889.

2. The Code of Commerce provisions on sales, partnership, agency, loan, deposit, and guaranty.

3. The provisions of the Civil Procedure on prescription, as far as they are inconsistent with the Civil Code.

4. All the laws, acts, parts of acts, Rules of Court, executive orders, and administrative regulations, inconsistent with the Civil Code.

2. If the general law was enacted after the special law, the special law remains unless:

a. There is an express declaration to the contrary;

b. Or there is a clear, necessary and irreconcilable conflict.

c. Or unless the subsequent general covers the whole subject and is clearly intended to replace the special law on the matter.

Case:

Bocobo vs. Estanislao, L-30458 August 31, 1976

FACTS:

A radio operator was accused of libel before the Municipal Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan, the municipality being one of the places where the broadcast was heard. It was contended that while RA 1289 vested exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases in Courts of First Instance, still under a later law, RA 3828, municipal courts in provincial capitals were given concurrent jurisdiction over certain crimes (up to certain penalty).

ISSUE:

Which court has jurisdiction?

HELD:

The court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Bataan has jurisdiction. Repeal of the special enactment (RA1289) by a general but later enactment (RA 3828) is NOT FAVORED, unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. This is so even if the provisions of the general but later law are sufficiently comprehensive to include matters apparently set forth in the special law. Incidentally, the suit must filed with RTC is to prevent undue harassment of the accused, in case, for instance, the suit is brought in a very remote municipality, simply because the broadcast was heard there.

[NOTE: An Act passed later but going into effect earlier will prevail over a statute passed earlier but going into effect later. This is because the later enactment expresses the later intent.

Effect if the Repealing Law is itself repealed:

a. When a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the first law repealed shall not thereby be revived, unless expressly so provided. (sec. 14, Rev. Administrative Code).

b. When a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by implication, is itself repealed, the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the language of the repealing statute provides otherwise. (U.S. v. Soliman, 26 Phil. 5).

Repealing acts and their effects:

The repeal of a statute:

1. It shall not affect or impair any act done, right vested, duty imposed, penalty accrued, or proceeding commenced before the taking effect of the repealing act;

2. The repealing acts are valid and create a new rule of construction which is binding to the courts. Most repealing statutes are curative.

Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines. (n)
[By: Noel Viray]

Judicial decisions, especially those of the Supreme Court, though not statutes, are part of our legal system insofar as they serve as precedents for cases with identical facts and legal questions. Judges, lawyers, and law students do not argue their positions concerning legal questions without basis, they look to the past for guidance; this is known as the legal principle of stare decisis. Furthermore, a judicial decision, much like statutes, are binding upon its subjects: the citizen who has to follow it, and the government itself, which has to execute the law in accordance with it.

In Caltex vs Palomar, the Court, seemingly irked by the suggestion that their rulings do not bind those who execute the law, made the following remarks: “Judicial decisions, although in themselves not laws, assume the same authority as the statute itself, and until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also those duty bound to enforce obedience thereto.”

Caltex vs Palomar had the gas giant and the Postmaster General locked in a legal battle in the 60’s, arguing whether or not Caltex’s Hooded Pump Contest violated the anti-lottery provisions of the postal laws. In this particular case, the Supreme Court decided in favor of Caltex, noting that the said contest required no payment, service, or consideration of any kind from the contestants, meaning that it cannot be treated as a lottery, and therefore did not fall under the anti-lottery provisions in the postal laws (Revised Administrative Codes 1954, 1982, 1983.) In summary, the Postmaster General had no recourse but to allow Caltex to make use of the mail in informing the public about the Hooded Pump Contest, as the Court decision had the force of law.

The Court’s interpretation of the law is to be taken as a reflection of the framer’s legislative intent, as such, it is to be considered as part of the legal system from the enactment of the law in question. However, a court’s decision – much like statutes that have prospective application -- while it is the prevailing doctrine, guides the actions of its subjects, and thus, upon their repeal, must not be applied prejudicially to those who acted in keeping faith with it.

In People vs Jabinal, the court declares, “When a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary, that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.”

People vs Jabinal clearly demonstrates this legal principle as it pitted two opposing Supreme Court interpretations: whether or not an appointed secret agent qualified as a peace officer, and as such, was exempted from needing to secure a permit or license (Sec 878, 879, Revised Administrative Code). In People vs Macaradang, the Court interpreted in the affirmative, a position it reversed in People vs Mapa in 1967. Jabinal’s offense was committed in 1964, during which time People vs Macarandang, which was decided in 1959, was the prevailing Supreme Court Interpretation. The court had to acquit Jabinal since very clearly, he acted under the legal force of People vs Macarandang. If his offense had been committed after the People vs Mapa decision, he would have been convicted.

Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. (6)

[By: Venancio C. Estabillo]

Article 9 speaks of a basic principle. One of the most fundamental in the case of effect and application of law. If there is no law, how will you resolve a legal issue? In this particular article, a judge should not refrain from rendering a judgment just because there is no law that governs a particular case. He must give a decision, whether he knows what law to apply or not. Thus, even if he does not know the rules of cockfighting, he must still decide the case.

Go back to the question, how will you resolve an issue legally when there is no law at all? As a judge you are bound to resolve an issue legally. You must apply first the law as a basis in making a decision. Of course, you have to consider also some jurisprudence. Jurisprudence refers to the theory or philosophy of law.

In case of silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws, a judgment may still be guided by the following:

1. Customs which are not contrary to law, public order or public policy;

2. Court decisions, foreign or local court, in similar cases;

3. Legal opinions of highly qualified writers and professors;

4. General principles of justice and equity; and

5. Rules of statutory construction.

HOW IF THE LAW IS UNJUST?

It is the duty of the court to apply the law without fear and favor, to follow its mandate and not to tamper with it.

JUDGE IS DUTY BOUND TO APPLY THE LAW.

The judge had no other alternative except to impose the rule of law despite of his religious and political beliefs; and respect and apply the law regardless of his private opinions.

Case (1):

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 174689. October 22, 2007

CORONA, J.:

FACTS:

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of petitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE.

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines, thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the change of the petitioner’s name and sex in his birth certificate are allowed?

RULING:

NO. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery.

Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.

RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

While petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

Case (2):

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN

G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

Quisumbing, J.

FACTS:

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate.

She alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in her Birth Certificate but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics.

She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

The RTC granted respondent’s petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 ORDERING the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna to correct the name of the petitioner from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and change the gender from female to MALE.

It is likewise ordered that petitioner’s school records, voter’s registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the RTC's ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the change of the petitioner’s name and sex in his birth certificate are allowed?

RULING:

YES. In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court shall not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences.

The respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. The respondent has also the right to be equally respected and protected under the law. In so ruling, the Court shall do no more than to give respect to the diversity of nature; and how the petitioner deals with what nature has handed him out. Moreover, the Court shall respect respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male.

Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail

[By: Rose Ann C. Villanueva]

When the law is clear, it must be applied, even if it is harsh or unjust. For the judge cannot change the mandate of the law.

Primary duty of the court is to apply the law

Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them

If there is ambiguity in the law, interpretation of the law requires fidelity to the legislative purpose.

What the congress intended is not to be frustrated. Its objective must be carried out even if there is doubt as to the meaning of the language employed, the interpretation, should not be at war with the end sought to be attained.

Case:

CESARIO URSUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:

Cesario Ursua had a complaint filed against him while being a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in Kidapawan, Cotabato.

On August 1, 1989 his counsel wrote the Office of the Ombudsman requesting a copy of the complaint. His counsel asked if he could bring the letter himself as the law firm’s messenger is not available.

Before heading to the Office of the Ombudsman, he talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant in going himself because he was the respondent of the complaint, the latter told him to just sign his name if ever he would be asked to acknowledge the receipt of the complaint.

The petitioner, Cesario Ursua, although hesitant, went to the Office of the Ombudsman himself and acknowledge the receipt of the complaint with the name of Oscar Perez. He was the greeted by Josefa Amparo who works with the same office as Loida, who then learned that the Oscar Perez who signed the receipt was actually the respondent of the case.

Cesario Ursua was charged and convicted by the trial court in violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085.

On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner, hence the appeal to the highest court.

He reiterated that he never used any alias before and used the name of Oscar Perez only once and with the latter’s permission.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ursua is liable with the illegal use of alias.

RULING:

No. The petitioner only used the name of Oscar Perez once and had never used any alias in any other transactions before. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended.

Statutes are to be interpreted or applied in relation with the purpose by which it was legislated.

Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced.

[By: Aneleth Anjolyn B. Valencia]

Custom Defined:

Custom is the juridical rule which results from a constant and continued uniform practice by the members of a social community, with respect to a particular state of facts, and observed with a conviction that it is juridically obligatory.

(1 Tolentino, Civil Code, p. 38, 1974 ed)

A custom is a rule of human action (conduct) established by repeated acts, and uniformly observed or practiced as a rule of society, thru the implicit approval of the lawmakers, and which is therefore generally obligatory and legally binding.

(16 Paras, Civil Code, p. 84, 2008 ed)

In the above definitions, custom is similarly established that it is;

*constant and continued uniform practice

*repeated acts, uniformly observed by a social community or society and not by an individual only.

In Martinez v Burskirk, 18 Phil. 79; it was said that a cochero who was helping a passenger unload his cargo and left the horse unattended to, was not held to be negligent, even if the horse galloped away, as a result of which the caretela caused injuries to a pedestrian. It was held that, that was the custom of the place.

Case:

S.D MARTINEZ vs WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK

G.R. No. L-5691, December 27, 1910

FACTS:

Carmen Ong de Martinez together with her child was riding a carromata in Ermita on 11^th of September 1908 when a delivery wagon attached to a pair of horses used for transporting fodder owned by William Van Buskirk ran at great speed into the carromata occupied by the plaintiff and overturned it. Severely wounding Carmen Ong de Martinez by making a serious cut on her head and injuring the carromata itself.

The defendant, William Van Buskirk contends that the cochero who was driving the delivery wagon at the time of the accident was a good and reliable servant. That upon the delivery of the forage, the cochero tied the driving lines to the front end of the delivery wagon and went back inside to unload the forage delivered. While unloading, another vehicle drove by where the driver cracked a whip and made other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and ran away. The cochero was thrown outside the delivery wagon and was unable to stop the horses which ran into collision with the carromata occupied by Carmen Ong de Martinez.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant is liable for the negligence of his driver.

RULING:

It was held that the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case.

The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, cannot be held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial.

It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without objection.

Custom must not be contrary to law, public order or public policy.

While the customs may be applied in lieu of a law, the same cannot be done if they are contrary to law, public order or public policy, for the latter cannot be countenanced.

If a custom is repugnant to public policy, public order or law it ought to be restrained.

Nor should custom be allowed or permitted which disturbs public order or which tends to incite rebellion against constituted authorities or resistance against public commands duly issued and legally promulgated

Note:

(Lubos v. Mendoza, C.A., 40 O.G 553); An Igorot custom of adoption without legal formalities is contrary to law and cannot be countenanced.

(Yamada v. Manila Railroad Co., 33 Phil 8); A custom which may endanger human life cannot be allowed.

Law distinguished from ‘Custom’

While ordinarily a law is written, consciously made, and enacted by Congress, a custom is unwritten, spontaneous, and comes from society. Moreover, a law is superior to a custom as a source of right. While the courts take cognizance of local laws, there can be no judicial notice of customs, even if local. (Art. 12, Civil Code).

Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.

[By: Aneleth Anjolyn B. Valencia]

In order that a custom must may be considered as a source of right, the following requisites must be proven:

1. Plurality of acts

2. Uniformity of acts

3. General practice by the great mass of the people of the country or community;

4. General conviction that it is the proper rule of conduct;

5. Continued practice for a long period of time; and

6. Conformity with law, morals and public policy (1 Manresa 82)

Article 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights, from sunset to sunrise.

[By: Lance Joseph Abad]

The law says that in the computation of the period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day shall be included.

Illustration:

A filed a suit at the RTC, Manila, against B. Summons was served upon B on September 1, 1996. In computing the 15-day period to file a responsive pleading, September 1, 1996 should not be included. The 15-day period shall be computed from September 2, because in the computation of a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day shall be included. The reason for the law is that you can no longer complete a whole day on September 1, 1996.

Examples of How periods are computed:

10 months = 300 days

Thus, a debt payable in 10 months must be paid at the end of 300 days, and not on the same date of a month, ten months later.

1 year = 365 days

This does not, however, apply in computing the age of a person. Thus, a person becomes 21 years old on his 21^st birthday anniversary, and not on the date arrived at by multiplying 21 by 365 days. However, in case the law speaks of years (as in prescriptive periods of crimes), it is believed that the number of years involved should be multiplied by 365. Thus, if a crime is committed today prescribes in 10 years, the end of said period would be 365*10 or 3650 days from today.

In effect, therefore, the period will be shorter than when the calendar reckoning is used because certain years are LEAP YEARS.

(NOTE: Any year, except a century year, is a leap year if it is exactly divisible by FOUR. In the case of century year the same must be exactly divisible by 400 to be LEAP YEAR (Example: the year 1600 was a leap year).

Case:

National marketing corporation V Tecson

GR no. L-2013127

August 1969

FACTS:

December 21, 1965, National Marketing Corporation filed a complaint, docketed as civil case no. 63701 on the same court, as successor of the Price Stabilization Corporation, against the same defendant from 10 years ago. Defendant Miguel Tecson moved to dismiss the said complaint upon the ground lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of that and prescription of action. The court, then, issued an order of dismissal with regards the article 13 of the civil code. However, National Marketing Corporation appealed to the court of appeals from such order. Looking at the fact that 1960 and 1964 is a leap year, they insisted that a year means a calendar year and a leap year would still be counted as 1 year even if it consists of 366 days. The case reached its conclusion with the appellants theory with regards to the article 13 of the civil code.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days.

RULING:

The term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days. However, it is said to be unrealistic and if public interest demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the revised administrative code, this may be done through legislative process and not by judicial decree.

u March = 31 days

u This is because the month is specifically designated by name (Art. 13, par. 2, Civil Code). Thus, if in a contract it is stipulated that performance should be done, say in the month of “March”, the act can still be validly performed on March 31.

u One week = seven consecutive days. But a week of labor, in the absence of any agreement, is understood to comprehend only six labor days.

Civil month or Solar month

The civil or solar month or calendar month is that which agrees with the Gregorian calendar, and those month in said calendar are known by the names of January, February, March, etc.

They are composed of unequal portions of time.

The general rule is that when months are not designated by name, a month is understood to be only 30 days: thus, Art. 30 of the Revised Penal Code refers to a “30-day” month, and not to the solar or civil month.

Meaning of ‘Day’ Applied to the filing of Pleadings

If the last day of submitting a pleading is today, and at 11:40 p.m (after office hours) today it is filed, the Supreme Court has held that it is properly filed on time because a day consist of 24 hours. This presupposes that the pleading was duly received by a person authorized to do so.

Computing of Periods

In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day be included. (Art. 13, last par. Civil Code.) Thus, 12 days after July 4, 2006 is July 16, 2006. In other words, we just add 12 to the first mentioned date.

Rule if the Last Day is Sunday or Legal Holiday

It depends.

a) In an ordinary contract, the general rule is that an act is due even if the last day be a Sunday or legal holiday. Thus, a debt due on Sunday must, in the absence of agreement, be paid on that Sunday. This is because obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties (Art. 1159, Civil Code)

There are, of course, some exceptions, among them the maturity date of a negotiable instrument.

b) When the time refers to a period prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, by an order of the court, or by any other applicable statute.

If the last day is a Sunday or a legal holiday, it is understood that the last day should really be the next day, provided said day is neither a Sunday nor a legal holiday.

Case:

Gonzaga vs. De David

L- 14858 Dec. 29, 1960

FACTS:

August 31 was the usual last day for payment of registration fees but it was declared a special public holiday by Presidential Proclamation. Now then under the law, the last day for said payment was the last working day in August (ordinarily August 31) but because of the holiday, the last working day in August for the Motor Vehicle Office was on August 30. Now then, may the fees still be paid without penalty on September 1?

HELD:

Yes, since August 31 was declared a holiday, payment could still be made on the next day, under Sec.31 of the Revised Adm. Code. The "last working day in August" for the general public in paying fees is not necessarily the same as the "last working day in August" for employees in the Motor Vehicle Office

Article 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations.

[By: Kristia Capio]

Territoriality theory is a concept wherein if the offense is committed within our territory it offends the state. Therefore any person, whether citizen or alien, can be punished for committing a crime in our country.

Generality theory is a concept wherein even aliens, male or female or anyone who live or sojourn under our territorial jurisdiction. This is because foreigners owe or have some sort of allegiance even if it be temporary.

CONFLICTING THEORIES ON TERRITORIALITY AND EXTERRITORIALITY

French theory highlights nationality and embraces that the matters happening on board of the merchant vessel which do not disturb the public peace of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the courts of the country to which the vessel belongs.

English theory emphasizes the principle of territoriality, wherein, it upholds that as soon as merchant vessels enter the ports of a foreign state, they become subject to local jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of the country are affected.

EXCEPTIONS:

Art. 14, recognizes two exceptions:

1. Principles of public international law

The following are not subject to the operation of our criminal laws:

1. Sovereigns and other chiefs of state

2. Ambassadors, ministers plenipotentiary, ministers resident, and charges d’affaires

It is a deep-rooted principle of international law that diplomatic representatives, such as ambassadors or public ministers and their official entourage, enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the country of where they are sojourn and cannot be sued, arrested or punished by the law of that country.

For example, if the diplomatic officials and visiting heads of states, provided the latter do not travel secretly. If they travel anonymously but with the knowledge of our government officials, heads of states are entitled to immunity. If the undercover travel is without the knowledge or consent of our country, diplomatic immunity cannot be contended upon, and the heads of states traveling may be arrested. But, once they reveal their identity, immunity is given.

Note: Consuls are subject to the jurisdiction of our criminal courts.

2. Presence of treaty stipulations

The Philippine-United States Military Bases Agreement, dated Mar. 14, 1947, which contains some provisions exempting certain members of the armed forces of the United States from the jurisdiction of our courts.

Case:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. WONG CHENG

G.R. No. L-18924. October 19, 1922

ROMUALDEZ, J.

FACTS:

Wong Cheng was charged of having illegally smoked opium on board of the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city. The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, therefore the case should be dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime committed on merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters.

RULING:

Yes. The possession of opium while on a foreign vessel in transit was not triable by our courts. However, to smoked opium within our territorial limits, even though on a foreign merchant ship was definitely a breach of the public order because it causes such drug which produced harmful effects within our territory.

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

[By: Janine May T. Gumangol]

Under Article 15, the Philippine follows the national theory, family rights and duties, status and legal capacity of Filipinos are governed by Philippine law.

· Family rights --includes parental authority, marital authority, support

· Status

· Condition

· Legal capacity (there are various exceptions to this rule on legal capacity)

Theories on Personal law

1. Domiciliary Theory- the personal laws of a person are determined by his domicile (Great Britain and United States)

2. Nationality Theory- the nationality or citizenship determines the personal laws of the individual

General Rule: Under Article 26 of the Family Code, all marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws of the country where the couple/s were solemnized and valid there as such, is also valid in the Philippines.

Exception: If the marriage is void under Philippine law, then the marriage is void even if it is valid in the country/ies where the couple/s were solemnized.

It must be observed that for Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code apply, the following requisites must be present:

Ø The marriage must be originally a mixed marriage

Ø The foreigner should be the one to initiate the divorce petition if granted, it should capacitate him under his national law to remarry.

Related Articles:

Exceptions:

1. Article 35 Section 2, Family Code

The following marriages shall be void from the very beginning:

Those solemnized by any person who is not legally authorized to solemnize marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so.

2. Article 35, Section 3, Family Code

The following marriages shall be void from the very beginning:

Those solemnized without license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter; even if the foreign marriage did not comply with either sections 2 and 3 of Article 35, Philippine law will recognize the marriage as valid as long as it is valid under foreign law.

Related Cases:

Ø Van Dorn Vs. Romillo Jr, 139 SCRA (Please refer the digested case to the distributed material

Ø Quita Vs. Dandan, G.R No. 124862

Ø Grace Garcia Vs. Rederick A. Recio, G.R No. 138322, October 2, 2001

Case:

ALICE REYES VAN DORN v. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Alice Van Dorn, a citizen of the Philippines, was married to Richard Upton, a US citizen. They obtained a divorce in Nevada, US and later on Alice Van Dorn remarried to Theodore Van Dorn. Conflict arose when, Upton claimed in the RTC through a petition that Galleon Shop in Ermita, Manila was a conjugal property which he ordered the latter to render an accounting of the business and that he be declared to manage the property.

Van Dorn then filed motion to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in divorce proceedings before Nevada Court which Upton acknowledged that they had no community property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Divorce decree is binding between the parties.

RULING:

Yes, it is true that the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, respondent is no longer the petitioner's husband. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as Vandorn's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.

Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a)
[By: Richard Ramos]

There is no dispute that real and personal properties are governed by the law of the place where they are situated. This is a restatement of the principle of Lex rei sitae.

There are four aspects of succession which are governed by the law of the person whose succession is under consideration, and they are:

(1). The order of succession;

(2) The amount of successional rights;

(3) The intrinsic validity of the will (Art. 16, New Civil code); and

(4) The legal capacity to succeed (Art. 1039, New Civil Code).

Under nationality principle, all these aspects of succession are governed by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration.

Nationality theory applied:

Case:

Testate Estate of Bohanan v. Bohanan, et al., 106 Phil. 977

FACTS:

This is an appeal from the decision of the lower court dismissing the objection filed by the oppositors, the wife and the two children of the deceased, to the project of partition submitted by the executor, Phil. Trust Co., and approving the said project of partition.

The testator was born in Nebraska, had properties in California, and has a temporary, although long, residence in the Philippines. In his will executed in Manila, he stated that he had selected as his domicile and permanent residenc , the State of Nevada, and therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that state. In his will, he disposed so much of his properties in favor of his grandson, his brother and his sister, leaving only a small amount of legacy of his children and none to his wife. The same was questioned by the surviving wife and the surviving children regarding the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate, claiming that they have been deprived of their legitimes under Philippine law, which is the law of the forum. With respect to the wife, a decree of divorce was issued between the testator and the wife after being married for 13 years; thereafter, the wife married another man whereby this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the testator.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testamentary dispositions, especially those for the children, which are short of the legitimes given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines are Valid.

HELD:

Article 10 of the old Civil Code, now Article 16 of the New Civil Code, provides that the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the person whose succession is in question. In the case at bar, the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada. Since the laws of said state allow the testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, his testamentary dispositions depriving his wife and children of what should be their legitimes under the law of the Philippines, should be respected and the project of partition made in accordance with his testamentary disposition should be approved.

When the Domiciliary theory applies.

In Aznar v. Garcia, 7 SCRA 95, a citizen of California, USA, was domiciled in the Philippines. He died, survived by two (2) acknowledged natural children. In his will, he left an estate worth P 500,000.oo to one of his children and P 3, 000.00 to the other. Under his national law, however, the disposition of estate or any question as to the validity of testamentary provisions shall be governed by his domiciliary law. The child who was given only P 3,000.00 questioned the validity of the disposition in favor of the other. The Supreme Court held for the child who was given P 3, 000.00 only. It was said that while Article 16 of the Civil Code states that the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions shall be governed by the decedent’s national law, nevertheless, the Civil Code of California declares that the decedent’s domiciliary law shall govern. Hence, the question shall be referred back to the decedent’s domicile.

Concept of renvoi.

Renvoi means referring back. When the conflicts rule of the forum refers a matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the corresponding conflicts rule of the foreign law , or is the reference to the purely internal rules of the foreign system a case in renvoi?

Renvoi doctrine

Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country and a domiciliary of another. A provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, illegal and void, for his national law, in this regard, cannot be ignored.

Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be govern by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in foreign country. (11a)

[By: Lacky Charlie Ramos]

In the 1st paragraph, if the contract/s where signed or executed in other country, the contract is valid only where it was signed.

Example:

A and B, both Filipino citizens had a vacation in USA, during their vacation, they decided to get married.

Their contract shall be void here in the Philippines, because their contract was made in the USA.

In the 2nd paragraph, if the contract was signed in other country, but duly subscribed by any consular officials of Philippine government in other country, the contract shall be valid in the Philippines.

2nd paragraph Example:

A and B, both Filipino citizens had vacation in USA, during their vacation, they got married duly subscribed by a Consular Official of the Philippines. Their contract as a husband and wife shall be valid in the Philippines.

3rd paragraph Example:

A and B, got married in the Philippines. They had a vacation in USA, during their vacation, they divorced. It shall be null and void in the Philippines, because divorced is prohibited in the Philippines and it against the morality of the Filipinos.

Case:

ZALAMEA VS COURT OF APPEALS 288 SCRA 23 (1993)

FACTS:

Mr. and Mrs. Zalamea and their daughter bought 3 plane tickets to the Manila Agent of TransWorld Airlines, Inc. (TWA) for them to flight from New York to Los Angeles last June 6, 1984. Tickets of Mr. & Mrs. Zalamea bought with 75% discount while on their daughter was in full payment. However, they were all confirmed for the reservation. On June 4, 1984, while they were in New York, once again they received a confirmation of their flight.

On June 6, 2018, Zalamea family checked in an hour before their flight, but they were put into the wait list for the reason of all seat of the plane were already occupied. Out of 42 on the wait list, the first 22 names were allowed to board on flight including Mr. Zalamea, while the others including his wife and daughter were left. Mrs. Zalamea and daughter wait for the next flight, but once again they were not allowed to board on flight for the same reason. Mrs. Zalamea decided to buy 2 tickets from American Airlines. Upon arrival in the Philippines, Mr. & Mrs. Zalamea filed a case against TWA for breach of contract of air carriage before the RTC of Makati which rendered decision favor to them. RTC of Makati ordered TWA to pay the amount of 2 Tickets bought by Mrs. Zalamea from American Airlines with moral damages and Atty’s fee. On appeal, the Court of Appeal said that moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of contract of carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. It also said that overbooking of flight is accepted and practice in United States code of Federal Regulation by the Civil Aeronautics Board.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the CA erred in accepting and finding that overbooking allowed in the United State Code of Federal Regulations and there has no fraud or bad faith in the part of TWA.

HELD:

The CA was in fault, there was fraud or bad faith when TWA did not allowed to board on their reserved and confirmed flight.

The United States law allegedly accepting and practiced overbooking has never been proved.

The court of appeal did not submit any written law attested by the officers having legal custody of the record with a certificate that such officers has custody made by any officer in the foreign service of the Phil. to prove that the US Code of federal Regulation allowed overbooking of flights.

Assuming that US Code of Federal Regulation allowed overbooking of flights, TWA was in bad faith by not informing the Zalamea Family that their flight were cancel or moved.

It shall be void here in the Philippines, and the Tickets were issued and sold in the Philippines.

Article 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code. (16a)
[By: Richard Ramos]

Chapter 2

HUMAN RELATIONS (N)

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.

[By: Evita Teope]

Definition of important terminologies in this Article:

Right is a power, privilege, or immunity granted under a constitution, statute, or decisional law; every well-grounded claim on others.

Duty is a human action which is exactly conformable to the laws which require us to obey them; a moral obligation or responsibility.

Justice is the constant and perpetual disposition to every man his due, the conformity of our actions and our will to the law.

Good faith is an honest intention to avoid taking undue advantage of another.

A right, although by itself legal because it is recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of illegality when it is exercised in a manner that does not conform to the norms enshrined in Article 19 NCC and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.

I. Coverage:

This pervades the entire legal system. This renders it impossible that a person who suffers damage because another has violated some legal provision should find himself relief.

Where one wrongfully or negligently does an act which in its consequences is injurious to another, he is liable for the damage caused by such wrongful act. It also applies to artificial and natural persons.

To warrant the recovery of damage, in any case, there must be a right of action for a wrong inflicted by the defendant and damage resulting to the plaintiff thereof.

As a general rule: "Wrong without damage and damage without wrong does not constitute a rule of action."

II. The necessity for the law:

This article contains the principle of abuse of rights. It indicates the range of allowable conduct among citizens or certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience and makes it imperative that everyone duly respects the rights of others.

III. The core of Article 19, NCC is bad faith

Good faith is always presumed.

Malice or bad faith is in the core of Articles 19, 20, and 21. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence, it involves dishonest purpose or some legal obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or will that partakes of the moral of the nature of fraud.

Malice or bad faith/motive never presumed. Anyone who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. (Elizabeth Diaz v. Encanto, et al G.R. no. 171303 Jan. 20, 2016)

Case:

Elizabeth Diaz v. Encanto, et al, G.R. No. 171303, Jan. 20, 2016, Leonardo - De Castro

FACTS:

This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which seeks to reverse and set aside the April 28, 2005 Decision and January 20, 2006 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 55165, which reversed the April 17, 1996 Decision and September 17, 1996 Order of the RTC, Branch 71, Pasig City, in CC No. 58397.

The Plaintiff-Appellant Elizabeth Diaz A Professor of the University of the Philippines applied for a sabbatical leave with pay, but it was denied.

This issue was brought to the court where the finding that the grant or denial of such leave is not a matter of right as it is subject to the exigencies of service like the acute shortage of teaching staff.

Even the Office of the Ombudsman has similar findings with the CA that the grand of leave is not a matter of right and there was no bad faith. Yet, before the SC, the applicant insisted that the concerned officials acted in bad faith. Sustaining the findings of the CA, the Office of the Ombudsman, and the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the officials of the U.P. acted in bad faith in the denial of the application of Diaz for sabbatical leave .

HELD:

There were no traces of bad faith or malice in denying the application for sabbatical leave. They processed the application in accordance with their usual procedure. While the RTC declared that the petitioner Diaz should have been granted a sabbatical leave, it is important to note that the RTC awarded damages to the petitioner merely for the unreasonable and unconscionable delay in the resolution of her application for sabbatical leave.

It is an elementary rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same.

Her complaint for the recovery of damages before the RTC was based on the alleged bad faith of the respondents in denying her application for sabbatical leave vis-a-vis Articles 19 and 20.

Article 19 of the Civil Code prescribes a 'primordial limitation on all rights' by setting standards that must be observed in the exercise thereof. Abuse of right under Article 19 exists when the following elements are present:

1. There is a legal right or duty;

2. Which is exercised in bad faith;

3. For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

The Court expounding on the concept of bad faith under Article 19, held that:

Malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. It is presumed. Thus, he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.

IV. Elements of abuse of right under Article 19:

1. There is a legal right or duty;

2. Which is exercised in bad faith;

3. For the sole intent of prejudicing and injuring another.

V. The principle for abuse of right under Art 19:

A person has the right to exercise his rights, but in so doing, he must be mindful of the rights of other people. Otherwise, he can be made liable for any damage(Meralco v. CA L-39019, Jan. 22, 1988)

VI. Standards set forth in Article 19

1. To act with justice;

2. To give everyone his due;

3. To observe honesty and good faith.

This article is also related to Articles 20 and 21:

Article 20 – provides general sanction for all other provisions of law. Anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby.

Article 21 – deals with contra bonos mores (or against good morals). It's elements are:

1. There is an act which is legal

2. But which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and

3. It is done with intent to injure

Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act that causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of damages.

Though the question whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in damages under articles 19, 20 and 21 and other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case.(Globe Mackay Cable v. CA 176 SCRA 778 [1989].

VII. The exercise of a right must be in good faith

One should in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, must strive to bring a measure of humanity into the law.

A man in the use of his right over the thing he owns or possesses should so act not to do injustice to others and should exercise his right with due respect to others rights observing at the same time honesty and good faith with his fellowmen.

VIII. Requirements for liability

To be liable under the law, the following requisites must be met:

1. The party claiming damages must have sustained the laws;

2. The party against whom they are claimed must be chargeable or guilty of the wrong complained of;

3. The loss must be the natural and proximate consequence of the wrong;

4. The wrong complained of must be contrary to law and the act or omission causing the damage should either be willful or a director a proximate result of negligence.

IX. Public Officer may be liable for his wrong doing under Art. 19.

The occupancy of a high public office cannot be used as a cloak against wrongdoing.

In fact, the SC ruled that a public officer can be sued in his individual capacity for his wrongdoing. (Chavez v. Sandiganbayan G.R. 91391, [January 24, 1991])

X. Civil liability despite acquittal; the bad faith of the defendant

David Llorente v. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. No. 85464

The performance of duty must be done with justice and good faith.

XI. Petitioner cannot invoke the principle of damnum absque injuria.

damnum absque injuria, a principle premised on the valid exercise of a right (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. CA, 176 SCRA 778)

Anything less or beyond such exercise will not give rise to the legal protection that the principle accords. And when damage or prejudice to another is occasioned thereby, liability cannot be obscured, much less abated.

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
[By: Noel Viray]

Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes, loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
[By: Venancio C. Estabillo]

This article was adopted with the intention to bring into the realm of law certain good Philippine customs, morals and traditions, especially those that concern family and personal relations.

Under this article are the following circumstances:

1. RECOVERY OF DAMAGES EVEN WITHOUT POSITIVE LAW.

There is marked distinction between Articles 20 and 21 of the civil code, for while the recovery under the former is based on law, the latter IS NOT BASED on law. If the loss or injury was due to a wilful act or omission and the same is contrary to morals, public policy, or good customs, LIABILITY would still attach upon the VIOLATOR.

Case:

SOLID BANK CORP. VS. MINDANAO FERROALLOY CORP.

G.R. No. 153535 July 28, 2005

FACTS:

Private respondents herein secured a loan to the petitioner bank under the name of the respondent corporation. In the course of the corporations operation, it was not able to pay its obligation to the petitioner and has to stop its operation. Petitioner bank filed an action against the corporation together with its principal officers for the collection of the loan they acquired. The RTC ruled in favor of the bank petitioner and ordering the respondent corporation to pay the amount of loan plus interest. On appeal, the CA held the decision of the RTC and ruled also that the private respondents were not solidary liable to the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not principal officers can be held personally liable upon signing the contract of loan under the name of the corporation?

RULING:

Basic is the principle that a corporation is vested by law with a personality separate and distinct from that of each person composing or representing it. Equally fundamental is the general rule that corporate officers cannot be held personally liable for the consequences of their acts, for as long as these are for and on behalf of the corporation, within the scope of their authority and in good faith. The separate corporate personality is a shield against the personal liability of corporate officers, whose acts are properly attributed to the corporation. Moreover, it is axiomatic that solidary liability cannot be lightly inferred. Since solidary liability is not clearly expressed in the Promissory Note and is not required by law or the nature of the obligation in this case, no conclusion of solidary liability can be made. Furthermore, nothing supports the alleged joint liability of the individual petitioners because, as correctly pointed out by the two lower courts, the evidence shows that there is only one debtor: the corporation.

How the law was justified?

Case below justified Article 21.

Case:

Pe et. al. vs. Pe

G.R. No. L-17396. 30 May 1962.

Bautista Angelo J.:

Appeal from a decision of the CFI Mla.

FACTS:

Plaintiffs are parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman 24 years of age. Defendant, a married man, frequently visited Lolita’s house on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him to pray the rosary. They fell in love and conducted clandestine trysts. When the parents learned about this they prohibited defendant from going to their house. The affair continued just the same. On April 14, 1957 Lolita disappeared from her brother’s house where she was living. A note in the handwriting of the defendant was found inside Lolita’s aparador. The present action was instituted under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The lower court dismissed the action and plaintiffs appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant committed injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.”

HELD:

“The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita’s affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed and injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.”

2. BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY; WHEN DAMAGES CAN BE RECOVERED.

Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. There must be an act independent of such breach in order that it may give rise to liability. There is no law that allows it. To be actionable, there must be some act independent of the breach of promise to marry as such:

1. Carnal Knowledge:

a. If it constitutes seduction as defined by the Penal Code, moral damages under Article 2219(3), NCC, may be recovered.

b. If it constitutes tort, damages under Arts. 21 and 2219(10), NCC may be recovered;

c. If the woman becomes pregnant and delivers, compensatory damages may be recovered;

d. If money was advanced and property was given to the defendant, plaintiff can recover the money and property. No one shall enrich himself at the expense of another.

2. If there was no carnal knowledge, but the act resulted in a tort, moral damages may be recovered. The rule is also true if money or property were advanced, in which case the same may be recovered.

Case:

Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-14628

FACTS:

Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was then a teacher in the in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost 10 years younger than her, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto.

ISSUE:

Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry?

RULING:

NO. She cannot recover moral damages for the breach, nevertheless she can recover compensatory damages for medical and hospitalization expenses during her pregnancy and delivery as well as attorney’s fees.

Because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.

SOME SITUATIONS WHERE ARTICLE 21 CAN BE APPLIED:

1. Breach of promise to marry; when actionable; defense of pari delicto

Case:

Gashem Shookat Baksh and Marilou Gonzales,

G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993

FACTS:

Gashem Shookat Baksh (Baksh) herein petitioner is an Iranian citizen who is studying herein the Philippines. On the other hand Marilou Gonzales (Gonzales) herein private respondent is a Filipino citizen. Sometime in 1987 Baksh courted and proposed to Gonzales for the purpose of marrying the latter. Thereafter, Baksh and Gonzales went to the latter’s parent so as to obtain their consent. Thus, Baksh and Gonzales started to live together under one roof. Subsequently, a week before their marriage, their relationship turned sour. Baksh started to abuse, maltreat and threatenedto kill Gonzales. This ordeal culminated to a confrontation before the barangay whereby Baksh repudiated their marriage agreement, asked Gonzales to leave and disclosed that he was alreadymarried to another woman. Aggrieved, Gonzales filed a complaint for damages against Baksh with theRTC.The RTC held in favor of Gonzales and awarded damages in her favor. On appeal with the CA,the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Now, Baksh comes before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of the CA. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Baksh can be held liable for damages for his breach of promise to marry Gonzales.

HELD:

The Court held that the breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, the Court rules that no foreigner should make a mockery of our laws. It was evident from the facts presented to the Court that Gashem Baksh had not intention to marry Marilou Gonzales on the account of her “ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.”

In the case presented, Gashem Baksh was not motivated by good faith and honest motive when he proposed his love and promised to marry Marilou Gonzales. He was merely motivated by lust and “clearly violated the Filipino’s concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women.”

The Court affirmed the Decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals pursuant to Article 21 of the New Civil Code, not because of the breach of promise to marry, but due the fraud and deceit employed by herein petitioner that willfully caused injury to the honor and reputation of the herein private respondent, which committed contrary to the morals, good customs or public policy.

2. When not a case of breach of promise to marry.

Case:

Wassmer vs. Velez,

12 SCRA 648

FACTS:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned to get married. However, Velez went away and Beatriz did not hear from him again. Beatriz sued Francisco and asked the latter to pay her moral damages. Velez contended that there is no provision of the law authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. However, the court did not find this defense meritorious because even though it is true that there is no law for breach of promise to marry, Wassmer still suffered frustration and public humiliation.

ISSUE:

Did the court err in ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff moral damages?

RULING:

The case at bar is not a mere breach of promise to marry because it is not considered an actionable wrong. The mere fact the couple have already filed a marriage license and already spent for invitations, wedding apparels, gives the plaintiff reason to demand for payment of damages. The court affirmed the previous judgment and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff moral damages for the humiliation she suffered; actual damages for the expenses incurred and exemplary damages because the defendant acted fraudulently in making the plaintiff believe that he will come back and the wedding will push through.

3. No breach of promise to marry

Case:

Tanjanco vs. CA,

18 SCRA 994

FACTS:

About December 1997, Apolonio courted Arceli both of adult age. That Apolonio expressed his undying love affection to Araceli also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings, in consideration of Apolonio promise of marriage Araceli consented and acceded to Apolonio’s pleas for carnal knowledge. Until December 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a child. Araceli informed Aplolonio and pleaded with him to make good his promises of marriage but instead of honoring his promises and righting his wrong, Apolonio stopped and refrained from seeing Araceli since about July 1959 has not visited her and to all intents and purposes has broken their engagement and his promises.

ISSUE:

Whether or not man seduced the woman entitling her to the rewards set forth in Art 21.

HELD:

No. Plainly there is voluntariness and mutual passion. The facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, Araceli, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with Apolonio, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Hence, the courts conclude that no case is made under Art. 21 of the Civil Code and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the CFI in dismissing the complaint. The decision of CA is reversed and that of CFI is affirmed.

4. Forcible taking of franchise is violative of Article. 2, NCC.

Case:

Cogo-Cubao Operators and Drivers Assn. vs. CA, et al.,

G.R No. 100727

FACTS:

A certificate of public convenience to operate a jeepney service was to be issued in favor of Lungsod Silangan to ply the Cogeo-Cubao route in 1983. Petitioner Association, on the other hand, was an organization which main purpose is representing respondents for whatever contract and/or agreement it will have regarding the ownership of units, and the like, of the members of the Association. Perturbed by respondents Board Resolution No. 9, adopting a Bandera' System under which a member of the cooperative is permitted to queue for passenger at the disputed pathway in exchange for the ticket worth twenty pesos, the proceeds of which shall be utilized for Christmas programs of the drivers and other benefits, and on the strength of defendants' registration as a collective body with the Securities and Exchange Commission, petitioners, led by Romeo Oliva decided to form a human barricade and assumed the dispatching of passenger jeepneys. Petitioner contends that the association was formed not to complete with the respondent corporation in the latter's operation as a common carrier; that the same was organized for the common protection of drivers from abusive traffic officers who extort money from them, and for the elimination of the practice of respondent corporation of requiring jeepney owners to execute deed of sale in favor of the corporation to show that the latter is the owner of the jeeps under its certificate of public convenience. Petitioner also argues that in organizing the association, the members thereof are merely exercising their freedom or right to redress their grievances. It, however, admitted that it is not authorized to transport passengers

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner usurped the property right of the respondent which shall entitle the latter to the award of nominal damages.

RULING:

YES. Under the Public Service Law, a certificate of public convenience is an authorization issued by the Public Service Commission for the operation of public services for which no franchise is required by law. In the instant case, a certificate of public convenience was issued to Respondent Corporation to operate a public utility jeepney service on the Cogeo-Cubao route.

5. Justify moral damages awarded to agricultural lessees.

Case:

Magbanua, et. Al. vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, et. Al.,

L-66870-72, June 29, 1985

FACTS:

The plaintiffs filed a petition against the respondents all surenamed Perez alleging that they are shared tenants of the defendants, and that the latter divert the flow of water from their farm lots which caused the drying up of their landholdings and asked to vacate their areas for they could not plant palay due to lack of water. The trial court rendered a decision in favor to the plaintiffs and ordered the defendants to pay moral and exemplary damages to the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed to the IAC which the latter affirmed the appeal by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to be awarded to the plaintiffs. Upon the reinstatement of the IAC, the trial court did not agree to the appellate court in its decision because the former believe that as shared tenants, they are entitled to be maintained as agricultural lessees in peaceful cultivation in their respective landholdings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the tenants of defendants were entitled to moral and exemplary damages.

HELD:

The petition is granted and the decision under review is modified and each of the plaintiffs is entitled to receive award of moral and exemplary damages by the defendants.

Under the law, the landowners have an obligation to keep the tenant in the peaceful and continuous cultivation of his landholding. In this case, it shows that the petitioners were denied irrigation water for their farm lots in order to make them vacate their landholdings. The defendants violated the plaintiff's rights and caused prejudiced to the latter by the diversion of water. Under Article 2219 (10), the Civil Code permits the award of moral damages for acts mentioned in Article 21 of the same Code which provides, Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The defendants acted in an oppressive manner which is contrary to the morals of the petitioners and therefore, they are liable for the compensation to the latter.

6. Liability in case a wife deserts her husband

Case:

Tenchavez vs. Escaňo,

15 SCRA 355

FACTS:

27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad, he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE:

Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.

HELD:

Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

7. Declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity with award or moral damages.

Case:

Noel Buenaventura vs. CA, et al.,

G.R. Nos. 127358, March 3, 2005

FACTS:

This case was instituted by Petitioner Noel Buenaventura where he stated that he and his wife, Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura, were both psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The lower court found that petitioner was merely under heavy parental pressure to marry, and deceived Private Respondent Isabel Singh to marry. Buenaventura was unable to relate to his wife, as a husband, and their son, Javy, as a father. Moreso, he had no inclination to make the marriage work such that in times of trouble, he’d rather choose to leave his family than reconcile with his wife.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not, based on the findings of the lower court, the marriage between Buenaventura and Singh may be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, due to the psychological incapacity of the petitioner.

2. Whether or not the award of moral damages to the aggrieved spouse is proper in such cases.

RULING:

1. Yes. The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Psychological incapacity has been defined, as no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

2. Based on the above definition of psychological incapacity, by declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same.

8. When liability arises in case of abuse of right.

Case:

Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, et al. vs. Roberto Reyes, alias “ Amay Bisaya,”

G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005

FACTS:

Respondent herein Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name ―Amay Bisaya,‖ alleged that while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, he was spotted by Dr. Violeta Filart, his friend of several years, invited him to join her in a party at the hotel‘s penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotel‘s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka. Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for whom she replied: ―of course.‖ Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the latter‘s present for the celebrant. At the penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart. After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by Ruby Lim, the Executive Secretary of Hotel Nikko. Reyes alleged that Ruby Lim, in a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, told him to leave the party because he was not invited. Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart but the latter, who was within hearing distance, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation. Afterwards, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel. Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman. Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorney‘s fees. Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a ―gate-crasher.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim are jointly and severally liable with Dr. Filart for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.

HELD:

The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (―to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury‖) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court‘s ruling that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee. Had respondent simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out

Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

[By: Rose Ann Villanueva]

Coverage of the Law

Law is intended to furnish a just solution or an equitable settlement to any injustice committed or grievances done.

Mislaid property

Owner is still constructively in possession although its custody may be in another whose premises it has been left there is the premise of hiding or safekeeping

Lost property

Articles are accidentally dropped in public place, public roads, or street.

There is an involuntary parting with the possession

Solutio indebti

Performance of something not due

No one shall enrich himself at the expense of another

Enrichment requires two conditions:

1. That a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification

2. Such benefit is derived at another’s expense or damage

Case:

Aniano Obaña vs The Court of Appeals and Aniceto Sandoval

G.R. No. L-36249 March 29, 1985 Melencio-Herrera, J

FACTS:

Aniano Obaña, the petitioner, requests for a review of the decision of the Appellate Court, on a complaint filed against him by Aniceto Sandoval, ordering him to return the 170 cavans of rice or pay the due with legal interest from the date of filing the complaint until fully paid.

Aniceto Sandoval, owner and manager of Sandoval and Son’s Rice Mill, is engaged in buying and selling of palay. On November 21, 1964 a negotiation was made between Sandoval and Chan Lin, the middle man, purchasing 170 cavans of rice at P 37.26 per cavan to be delivered to the petitioner and payment be made upon delivery by Chan Lin. Transacting with Obaña before, Sandoval accepted the offer.

Delivery pushed through the following day but Chan Lin was nowhere to be found. The truck driver approached the petitioner for the payment but the latter refused to pay insisting that he already paid Chan Lin P33.00 per cavan of rice.

Sandoval then filed suit for replevin before the Municipal Court, which ordered the petitioner-defendant to pay Sandoval Half of the cost of the rice.

Obaña made an appeal to the Court of First instance in La Union, judgement dismissed the complaint against petitioner-defendant.

On an appeal to respondent Appellate Court, Sandoval obtained a reversal in his favor, hence this appeal of the petitioner.

Before the Court of First Instance in La Union, the petitioner-defendant admitted that three days after the delivery, Chan Lin with Sandoval’s driver repaid the sum of P 5,600.00 and that he had returned the rice back to them. The driver denied the statement of Obaña.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Obaña should return or pay the amount purchased with legal interest from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid and with costs against the petitioner.

RULING:

Yes. In the case wherein the petitioner was repaid the purchases price by Chan Li three days after the delivery, the sale between them had been voluntarily ended. Obaña should have returned the rice if not paid the amount due to Sandoval. In this case it is well established that Obaña was enriched at the expense of Sandoval by holding on to a property no longer belonging to him.

The court affirmed the judgement under review and also ordered the costs against the petitioner.

There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, may it be money or property. This is against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.

Article 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited.

[By: Aneleth Anjolyn Valencia]

What is contemplated by Article 23 is an involuntary act or an act which through unforeseen could not have been avoided. This is based on equity.

Duty to Indemnify because of Benefit Received

Unless there is a duty to indemnify, unjust enrichment will occur.

Example:

Without A’s knowledge, a flood drives his cattle to the cultivated highland of B. A’s cattle are saved, but B’s crop is destroyed. True, A was not at fault but he was benefited. It is but right and equitable that he should indemnify B. (Report of the Code Commission, pp. 41-42)

In the above situation, if there is no duty to indemnify or to pay for just compensation, B would unfairly benefit by chance and misfortune of A in which B has not worked or paid for.

Here unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine applied in the absence of a contract and used to prevent one person from being unjustly enriched at another’s expense.

Article 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age, or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
[By: Lance Joseph Abad]

Who are protected by the Law?

The law is designated to protect those at:

· Disadvantage position by reason of moral dependence

· Ignorance
· Indigence
· Mental weakness
· Tender Age
· Other Handicap

It is designated to implement the principle of parens patriae, and the courts, as guardians of the rights of the people, are called upon to implement such policy.

What the protection covers.

The law is explicit in giving protection to one who is at a disadvantaged position in all contractual, property or other relations.

TAKE NOTE:

Law merely gives protection to the illiterates, a classification intended by the legislature, designed to give them ample protection, which can be considered as an implementation of the social justice concept of President Magsaysay. “That those who have less in life should have more in law.” Courts are bound to protect the rights of the less privileged.

Law applied in a rape case.

In People v. Casipit, applied the principle of parens patriae in a rape case committed on a girl of tender age by a relative.

There are times when rape is very difficult to prove, but in the cited case, the Supreme Court applied the principle of parens patriae when it is said that where a child of tender age is raped especially by a relative, the Court would always have the tendency to rely on her testimony.

“Where the victims of rape are of tender years, there is a marked receptivity on the part of the courts to lend credence to their version of what transpired, a matter not to be wondered at, since the State, as parens patriae, is under obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are not yet able to fully protect themselves.

Case:

PEOPLE v. GUILLERMO CASIPIT Y RADAM

GR No. 88229, May 31, 1994

FACTS:

The victim, Myra Reynaldo, was then 14 years old and a sixth grader, while appellant was 22. They were neighbors in Victoria, Alaminos, Pangasinan.

On 19 September 1986, before going to Manila for a medical checkup, the father of Myra entrusted her to the parents of Guillermo. On the same day, Guillermo invited Myra to go to the town proper of Alaminos to buy rice and bananas. When they reached the poblacion, he told her that they should buy in Dagupan instead because the prices were cheaper. She agreed. Upon arriving in the poblacion, Guillermo invited Myra to watch a movie. They watched the movie until six o'clock in the evening, after which, they took a ride for Alaminos arriving there at eight o'clock. They took their dinner in Alaminos before proceeding home to Barangay Victoria. On their way home it rained hard that they had to take shelter in a hut in the open field of Barangay Talbang. Inside the hut, Myra sat on the floor while Guillermo lay down. After a few minutes, he told her to lie down with him and rest. Then he went near her. He removed her panties, poked a knife at her neck and warned her not to shout. She resisted appellant, kicked him twice, but was helpless to subdue him as he tied her hands behind her nape. Moreover, he opened her legs, went on top of her, and the inevitable had to come. He mounted an assault on her chastity until he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. She could not stop him as he was big and strong. After the sexual encounter, she felt pain and could not sleep.

After waking up the following morning, they proceeded home. On their way, he told her to proceed ahead. When she reached home, she was observed to be walking abnormally (bull-legged) by Rogelio Casipit, her cousin-in-law. When her aunt, Nenita Rabadon, learned about it, she called for her and asked her what happened. She then narrated everything to her. Her aunt took her to the house of their barangay captain, Bruno Carambas, and reported the incident to him. The barangay official then called for Guillermo but he denied having raped Myra.

While inside the house of the barangay captain, the victim was examined by her sister-in-law Susan Cabigas and Elsa Carambas, wife of the barangay captain, who both found the victim's private part reddish and her panties stained with blood.

The following afternoon, Myra, accompanied by an uncle, went to the police station of Alaminos to report the rape and then to the Western Pangasinan General Hospital where she was examined by Dr. Fideliz Ochave. The medical findings of Dr. Ochave showed no external sign of physical injuries but noted the presence of first degree fresh healing laceration at the perineum and of the hymen at six o'clock position. The laboratory result was negative for spermatozoa.On 26 September 1986, Myra gave her statement to the police and later filed a criminal complaint against Guillermo.

The version of Guillermo, on the other hand, is that long before the incident, he and Myra were sweethearts. On 19 September 1986, they agreed to watch the movie "Cabarlo" so they went to Dagupan City. They entered the moviehouse at noon and left at six o'clock in the evening. While watching the show, he placed his arm on the shoulder of Myra and she did not object. He kissed her several times; she kissed him as many times. They talked about their love for each other. After the movie, they went home. However, when they reached Alaminos, it rained hard so they sought shelter in a hut. They removed their wet clothes. He embraced her and she liked it. Then he lowered her panties and she did not resist. He laid her down on the floor and she consented. He joined her on the floor. He placed himself on top of her and sexual intercourse followed as a matter of course. They stayed inside the hut the whole night. They went home together the following morning. After the love tryst, he went to look for a job in San Juan, Metro Manila. He was arrested in July 1987. He contended that the victim was probably induced by her aunt Nenita Rabadon to file the case.

Appellant now assails the trial court for giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses while disregarding his and worse, for finding him guilty instead. He maintains that the victim's story contained many flaws: firstly, even as she had testified that she struggled with him and kicked him twice, the doctor who examined her found no external physical injuries on her body; secondly, the fact that the victim agreed to have a movie date with him shows that she liked him and was attracted to him; and, thirdly, the victim did not leave the hut but slept with him until morning, which is an unnatural behavior of one who had been raped.

ISSUE:

Worth noting is the marked receptivity of our courts to lend credence to the testimonies of victims who are of tender years regarding their versions of what transpired since the State, as parens patriae, is under obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are not yet able to fully protect themselves.

RULING:

There are times when rape is very difficult to prove, but in the above-cited case, the Supreme Court applied the principle of parens patriae when it said that where a child of tender age is raped especially by a relative, the Court would always have the tendency to rely on her testimony. The appealed decision finding accused-appellant GUILLERMO CASIPIT y RADAM guilty of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the indemnity in favor of MYRA REYNALDO is increased to P50,000.00.

Article 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of acute public want or emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any government or private charitable institution.

[By: Kristia Capio]

The basis for this legal provision is concisely pointed out by a respected civil law author: “When the rich indulge in thoughtless extravagance or display during a period of acute public want or emergency, they may unwittingly kindle the flame of unrest in the hearts of the poor who thereby become more keenly conscious of their privation and poverty and who may rise against the obvious inequality.” (Tolentino, I Civil Code of the Philippines [1990], p. 91)

Thoughtless extravagance during emergencies may provoke the situations of those who cannot afford to spend. There are three requisites that must be existent for this provision to be apply. First, there must be an acute public want or emergency. Second, there must be a thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display. Third, only government or private charitable institutions could file the action seeking to stop the thoughtless extravagance.

Ferdinand Marcos actually used this provision when he issued an order prohibiting elective local officials from holding luxurious fiestas and social gathering (General Order No. 15, 1972). Aside from this, this particular article of the Civil Code has been barely used. In fact, one would be hard pressed to find a Supreme Court case on this matter. If there was, it would have given us guidance on how this provision of the Civil Code should be interpreted

ILLUSTRATION

This provision can be illustrated like for example, in 2008, Baguio City suspended the issuance of permits for motorcades along its roads, citing the said Civil Code provision against indulging during critical times. Also, in 2002, a court in Nueva Vizcaya issued a "temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing the Sangguniang Panlalawigan members from buying 13 luxury vehicles" for their own individual use, citing the same Civil Code provision.

This was the wedding of Marian Rivera and Dingdong Dantes that became an issue because of this provision. Wherein, Former President Noynoy Aquino was at their wedding where in fact there are so many Filipinos affected by Typhoon Seniang. Likewise, motorists and commuters along E. Rodriguez and other streets near the Immaculate Conception Cathedral were even rerouted in Cubao, Quezon City during their big day.

Case:

VICTORIA SEGOVIA v. CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION

GR No. 211010, Mar 07, 2017

CAGUIOA, J.

FACTS:

Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued AO 171 which created the Presidential Task Force on Climate Change (PTFCC) on February 20, 2007 to address the demand for a more tangible response to climate change. In 2009, AO 254 was issued, mandating the DOTC to formulate a national Environmentally Sustainable Transport Strategy (EST) for the Philippines. Later that sam,e year, Congress passed the Climate Change Act and it created the Climate Change Commission.

Petitioners wrote respondents concerning their appeals for implementation of the Road Sharing Principle, trying the reform of the road and transportation system in the whole country. Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents, on behalf of their children, who in turn represent "Children of the Future, and Car-owners who would rather not have cars if good public transportation were safe, convenient, accessible, available, and reliable". They assert that they are authorized to the issuance of the unusual writs due to the suspected failure and refusal of respondents to execute an act mandated by environmental laws.

The government's violation of thoughtless extravagance in the middle of acute public want under Article 25 of the Civil Code for failure to reduce personal and official consumption of fossil fuels by at least fifty percent. They also complain the "unequal" protection of laws in the dominant scheme, requesting that ninety-eight percent of Filipinos are discriminated against by the law when the car-owning two percent is given almost all of the road space and while large budgets are allocated for construction and maintenance of roads, hardly any budget is given for sidewalks, bike lanes and non-motorized transportation systems. Respondents argued that petitioners have no standing to file the petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners have standing to file the petition.

RULING:

No. The petition is dismissed due to procedural grounds. The petitioners' failure to illustrate any violation on the part of the respondents renders it unnecessary to rule on other accusations of violation that the petitioners rely upon as causes of action against the public respondents.

Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

[By: Janine May T. Gumangol]

1. Prying (inquire too closely) into the privacy of another's residence:

It includes respect for another's name, picture or personality except when needed for publication of information and pictures of legitimate news value.

It includes alienation of the affections of husband and wife.

2. Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;

It includes alienation of the affections of the husband and wife

Alienation of Affections--maliciously interfering with a marriage, resulting in damage to the marital relationship.

3. Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

Gossip

4. Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

Religious freedom does not authorize anyone to heap obloquy (harsh or critical statement about someone) and disrepute upon another by reason of the latter's religion.

Case:

St. Louis Realty Corp. vs CA

FACTS:

Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist, seek to recover damage for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio.

St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading “HOME IS WHERE THE HEART IS”. In the advertisement, the house featured was Dr. Aramil’s house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission and the intended house to be published. After Dr. Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No apology was published was published by St. Louis. This prompted Dr. Aramil’s counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadio’s real house but nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for damages on March 29. During the April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published.

ISSUE:

Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil.

HELD:

St. Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication. Furthermore, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".

The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees.

When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the judgement for the reason that “St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps”.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.

ARTICLE 27 . Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken

[By: Lacky Charlie Ramos]

Explanation:

Every person who is a public official or employee has their own function or duties together with responsibilities.

If an individual ask an assistance to a public official or employee in the exercise of their duty, and if that public official or employee refuses to to do their job, he/she must be liable for damages that may be sustained or incurred by a private individual.

Own Example:

A is a duty Doctor of EMERGENCY ROOM of LAGUNA MEDICAL CENTER (LMC), B is a patient who was stabbed in his chest by his neighbor, B was brought to LMC at around 3 o'clock in the after noon, upon arrival to the hospital, the Doctor was not around, relatives of B asked where is thw Doctor, the staffs of LMC said that the Doctor was taking rest/sleeping because there were a lot of patients before the arrival of B. The staffs gave first aid to B, but it was not enough, B died at around 4 o'clock in the after noon without checking him by A.

Relatives of B may file for damages against A and for serious neglect of duty.

Case:

LEDESMA VS COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. NO. L-54598, APRIL 15, 1988

FACTS:

Mr. Ledesma was elected as a president of Students Leadership Club of a State College while Miss Delmo was elected as a treasurer. In that capacity, Miss Delmo extended loans to some students coming from the organization funds. Mr. Ledesma said that it was against the school rules. He wrote Miss Delmo informing her that she was being dropped from the organization, and she will not be a candidate for any award from the school. Miss Delmo appealed to the Bureau of Public Schools which was rendered a descition favored to her. Bureau of Public Schools directed Mr. Ledesma not to deprive Miss Delmo of any award if she is entitled to it. On the graduation day, onc again, Mr. Ledesma received a telegram from the Director, ordering him not to deprive Miss Delmo if there were an award entiled to her. At that time, it is impossible to include Miss Delmo in a program as one of the honors student. Mr. Ledesma let her graduate as a plain student instead of being honor for Magna Cum Laude.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, Miss Delmo may file for damages against Mister Ledesma

HELD:

Miss Delmo suffered through a painful ordeal because of Mister Ledesma's neglect of duty. Miss Delmo graduated as a plain student instead of being Magna Cum Laude because of Mister Ledesma failure to include her in a program as a one of honor students even he was directed by the Director not to deprive Miss Delmonin any award if she was entitled to it.

Under Article 27 of the civil code, any person sufferring material or moral loss beacause a public servant or employee refuses or neglects without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other releif against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken. WHEREFORE, Mr. Ledesma was liable for damages.

Article 28. Unfair competition is agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.

[By: Richard Ramos]

Unfair competition in itself is a crime punishable under Article 189 of the Revised Penal code. While competition in business is healthy because it tends to improve one’s products, yet if one uses force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method to deprive others of legitimate earnings, then that act may give rise to an action for damages.

Where a person drives away his competitors in business by preventing them from selling their goods inspire of their licenses to engage in that business in a place, that person is liable for damages and the action may be filed independently of the criminal prosecution.

Evils of capitalistic world

This being a new provision, there is enough justification and reasonable necessity to elucidate its meaning, concept, and implications, hence the following comments. In ta democratic form of government like ours, free enterprise and fair competition are of the essence. In actuality, however, free enterprise is stifled, if not altogether supplanted, by rich enterprises of the rich, by the rich, and for the rich. Monopolies have not only enriched the rich but have impoverished and pauperished the poor and the paupers. They are the worst deterrent, if not obstacle, to the fair distribution of wealth and surpluses of a community, or of a nation, or of the world. These monopolies and trusts are not altogether brought about in a sudden, but have grown and spread throughout the length and breadth of the capitalistic world on account of the pernicious and evil effects or unfair competition and cut-throat rivalries in commerce, business, trade and other gainful occupations and undertakings. It is this reason; we suppose that has prompted the Code Commission to insert a regulatory, if not a repressive, measure as contemplated in this article (Garcia and Alba, Civil of Code of the Phils. Commentaries and Jurisdiction, 1950 ed., p. 77)

Article 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complainant should be found to be malicious.

If in criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
[By: Noel Viray]

Article 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.
[By: Noel Viray]

Neither Albano nor Paras cited any case concerning Article 30 in their respective books, so we are left with nothing but the words themselves of this article. Here we can clearly see the difference in the level of evidence required by a criminal case vis-à-vis a civil case. Where proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to settle a criminal case, a mere preponderance of evidence is all that a civil case requires

Article 31. When the civil action which is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

[By: Venancio C. Estabillo]

This article refers to a civil action which is no longer based in the criminal liability of the defendant, but on an obligation arising from other sources, like law, contracts, quasi-contracts and quasi-delicts.

Application of Article 31.

1. Civil action to recover the proceeds of sale of goods covered by a trust receipt

“Violation of the Trust Receipt Law”

(P.D No. 115 January 29, 1973)

Case:

South City Homes, Inc. vs. BA Finance G.R No. 135462, 07 December 2001

FACTS:

On January 17, 1983, Joseph L. G. Chua, President of Fortune Motors Corporation, executed in favor of plaintiff-appellant a Continuing Suretyship Agreement, in which he "jointly and severally unconditionally" guaranteed the "full, faithful and prompt payment and discharge of any and all indebtedness" of Fortune Motors Corporation to BA Finance Corporation. On February 3, 1983, Palawan Lumber Manufacturing Corporation represented by Joseph L.G. Chua, George D. Tan, Edgar C. Rodrigueza and Joselito C. Baltazar, executed in favor of plaintiff-appellant a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in which, said corporation "jointly and severally unconditionally" guaranteed the "full, faithful and prompt payment and discharge of any and all indebtedness of Fortune Motors Corporation to BA Finance Corporation (Folder of Exhibits, pp. 19-20). On the same date, South City Homes, Inc. represented by Edgar C. Rodrigueza and Aurelio F. Tablante, likewise executed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in which said corporation "jointly and severally unconditionally" guaranteed the "full, faithful and prompt payment and discharge of any and all indebtedness" of Fortune Motors Corporation to BA Finance Corporation.

Fortune Motors Corporation thereafter executed trust receipts covering the motor vehicles delivered to it by CARCO under which it agreed to remit to the Entruster (CARCO) the proceeds of any sale and immediately surrender the remaining unsold vehicles. ). The drafts and trust receipts were assigned to plaintiff-appellant, under Deeds of Assignment executed by CARCO.

Upon failure of the defendant-appellant Fortune Motors Corporation to pay the amounts due under the drafts and to remit the proceeds of motor vehicles sold or to return those remaining unsold in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt agreements, BA Finance Corporation sent demand letter to Edgar C. Rodrigueza, South City Homes, Inc., Aurelio Tablante, Palawan Lumber Manufacturing Corporation, Joseph L. G. Chua, George D. Tan and Joselito C. Baltazar (Folder of Exhibits, pp. 29-37). Since the defendants-appellants failed to settle their outstanding account with plaintiff-appellant, the latter filed on December 22, 1983 a complaint for a sum of money with prayer for preliminary attachment, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent BAFC has a valid cause of action for a sum of money following the drafts and trust receipts transactions.

HELD:

As an entruster, respondent BAFC must first demand the return of the unsold vehicles from Fortune Motors Corporation, pursuant to the terms of the trust receipts. Having failed to do so, petitioners had no cause of action whatsoever against Fortune Motors Corporation and the action for collection of sum of money was, therefore, premature.

A trust receipt is a security transaction intended to aid in financing importers and retail dealers who do not have sufficient funds or resources to finance the importation or purchase of merchandise, and who may not be able to acquire credit except through utilization, as collateral, of the merchandise imported or purchased. In the event of default by the entrustee on his obligations under the trust receipt agreement, it is not absolutely necessary that the entruster cancel the trust and take possession of the goods to be able to enforce his rights thereunder.

Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

[By: Rose Ann C. Villanueva]

1. Freedom of religion;

2. Freedom of speech;

3. Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;

4. Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

5. Freedom of suffrage;

6. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

7. The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

8. The right to the equal protection of the laws;

9. The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;

10. The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

11. The privacy of communication and correspondence;

12. The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;

13. The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;

14. The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;

15. The right of the accused against excessive bail;

16. The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;

17. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one’s self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;

18. Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and

19. Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant’s act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted) and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

Basic Constitutional Rights:

1. Violation of the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability.
2. Even if it does not amount to a crime, a person may still be held civilly liable and shall be proved by preponderance of evidence.

Renders any public officer or employee or any public individual liable; including military officers and officials.

Case:

Padua, et al. vs Robles, et al.

G.R. No. L-40486, August 29, 1975

FACTS:

Spouses Padua filed a criminal case against taxi cab driver, Romeo N. Punzalan, who caused the death of the plaintiff's son. Subsequently, a civil case was also filed and the court a quo ordered for the payment for the damages that resulted from the charges.

Unable to collect the indemnity caused by the incident, the spouses filed a civil case against Robles, the owner of the taxi cab company.

Court dismissed the case in favor of Robles.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the employer can be held liable.

RULING:

Yes. From the merits of the civil case as well as the decision applied on the criminal case of Punzalan, same can be deduced to the owner of the taxi cab. Any person who directly or indirectly violates any of the following rights mentioned in Article 32 can be held liable.

Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility.

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

[By: Aneleth Anjolyn B. Valencia]

Defamation – or libel or slander or intrigue against honor

Fraud – or estafa or swindling

Physical Injuries – including consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide, murder, parricide, infanticide – so long as there was physical injury.

The term “physical injuries” is used in the foregoing article in its generic sense and has been interpreted to include death. It was held in Carandang vs. Santiago and Valenton, 97 Phil. 94, that the term “physical injuries” should be understood to mean injury, not the crime of physical injuries.

Case:

CESAR M. CARANDANG vs. VICENTE SANTIAGO

G.R No. L-8238, May 25, 1955

FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari to annul the order of Judge Vicente Santiago, regarding his suspension of the civil case filed by petitioner Cesar Carandang to Tomas Valenton Sr. and Tomas Valenton Jr. to await the result of the criminal case also filed by petitioner against the defendants.

In the criminal case, the accused was charged with and convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide, and while it was found in the criminal case that a wound was inflicted by the defendant on the body of the petitioner herein Cesar Carandang, which wound is bodily injury, the crime committed is not physical injuries but frustrated homicide, for the reason that the infliction of the wound is attended by the intent to kill. So the question arises whether the term "physical injuries" used in Article 33 means physical injuries in the Revised Penal Code only, or any physical injury or bodily injury, whether inflicted with intent to kill or not.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Judge committed an error in suspending the trial of the civil case.

HELD:

The Article in question uses the words "defamation", "fraud" and "physical injuries." Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the term "physical injuries" could not have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article — some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term "physical injuries" should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code Commission recommended that the civil for assault and battery in American Law, and this recommendation must have been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death.

A parallel case arose in that of Bixby vs Sioux City, 164 N. W. 641, 643. In that case, the appellant sought to take his case from the scope of the statute by pointing out that inasmuch as notice is required where the cause of action is founded on injury to the person, it has no application when the damages sought are for the death of the person. The court ruled that a claim to recover for death resulting from personal injury is as certainly "founded on injury to the person" as would be a claim to recover damages for a non-fatal injury resulting in a crippled body.

For the foregoing considerations, we find that the respondent judge committed an error in suspending the trial of the civil case, and his order to that affect is hereby revoked, and he is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of said civil case without awaiting the result of the pending criminal case.

*****

In Marcelo Jervoso, et al. vs. People and CA, G.R. No. 89306, September 13, 1990, the Supreme Court also said that the term “physical injuries” in Article 33 is used in a generic sense. It includes consummated, frustrated or attempted homicide.

Case:

MARCELO JERVOSO, et al. vs PEOPLE AND COURT OF APPEALS

G.R No. 89306, September 13, 1990

FACTS:

The victim Rogelio Jervoso was going towards the store of the spouses Marcelo Jervoso and Norma Closa for the purpose of buying bread. While said eyewitness was about four meters distance from the store, he saw Rogelio Jervoso walking back and forth in front of the store and had his back turned away from Marcelo when the latter pulled a bolo from his waist and stabbed Rogelio at the back. After being wounded, Rogelio ran away, but was already fallen face down inside Mrs. Olmedo’s yard when Marcelo and his wife Norma catches-up with him. There, Marcelo stabbed Rogelio’s back again and Norma struck the fallen Rogelio with a stone she picked-up. The victim was brought to Abuyog General Hospital where he later expired.

In his defense, Marcelo Jervoso declared that Rogelio Jervoso entered his office without knocking and arrogantly asked him about the lands he was possesing and that he told Rogelio to come back the next day so that both of them can see his adoptive mother Afra Diaz who can enlighten Rogelio. Marcelo then went outside and was stabbed by Rogelio on his left back part of his upper arm. He ran towards the front yard of Mrs. Olmedo and was intercepted by Marcelo who lunged at him and delivered another stabbing blow but was able to get hold of the right wrist holding the deadly weapon and wrest it from Rogelio’s hold by twisting his right hand. While Marcelo is still pinned by Rogelio against the concrete fence, Marcelo delivered two stabbing blows and pushed Rogelio who fell to the ground.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the penalty be imposed on appellant Marcelo Jervoso, should be imprisonment of 6 years and 1 day of prison mayor as minimum to 12 years of prison mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Rogelio Jervoso in the amount of P30,000.00, Philippine Currency.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners should pay the indemnity of P30,000 to the heirs of Regelio Jervoso despite the reservation by the said heirs of their right to file a separate civil action against the accused, which they did file in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

HELD:

The filing of a separate civil action for damages against the accused by the heirs of the decease victim is authorized under Article 33 of the Civil Code which provides:

Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

The term “physical injuries” in Article 33 is used in generic sense. It included consummated, frustrated, or attempted homicide (Majeda vs. Cruz, 126 SCRA 293, cited Vol I, p. 62 Civil Code, 1990., Ed by R.C Aquino). rt of Appeals likewise erred in affirming the award.

Having reserved and filed in the Regional Trial Court in Manila a separate civil action to recover the civil liability of the accused arising from the crimes charged, the heirs of the deceased Rogelio Jervoso, are precluded from recovering damages in the criminal case against the accused, for they are not entitled to recover damages twice for the same criminal act of the accused. The trial court erred in awarding to the heirs of Rogelio Jervoso in the criminal case P30,000 as civil indemnity for his death despite their reservation to file a separate civil action for that purpose. The Cou

No Need to reserve independent civil action.

Rule 111, Section 1, of the Rules of Court requires the action to be reserved;

“Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.— (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. “The Reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.”

“Section 2. Independent civil action. –– In the cases provided for in Article 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.”

“Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. –– In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.”

Note:

The foundation of Article 33 is the Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that every person who is criminally liable shall also be civilly liable.

There is NO NEED TO RESERVE the right to prosecute the civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.

While the Rules of Court require reservation, what is reserved is the right to file a civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the crime charged as a felony; otherwise it is deemed filed with the criminal action.

The PURPOSE of RESERVING of civil action is to prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission.

Independent civil action; when deemed not barred despite intervention by private prosecutor.

Case:

ZENAIDA CRUZ REYES vs HON. JUDGE ALICIA SEMPIO-DIY, et al.,

G.R No. L-71914, January 29, 1986

FACTS:

Cristina Malicsi was charged with the crime of intriguing against honor. The aggrieved party therein was Zenaida Cruz Reyes, the herein petitioner. In said case Zenaida Cruz Reyes was represented by a private prosecutor, Atty. Barayang. The accused pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced by the Court to a fine of P50.00. Because of her plea of guilty, the aggrieved party was unable to present evidence to prove damages against the accused. Neither was she able to make a reservation of her right to file a separate civil action for damages. Instead, she filed a new action against Cristina Malicsi and her husband with the Regional Trial Court for damages arising from the defamatory words uttered against her by Cristina Malicsi which was the subject of the information filed against the latter for intriguing against honor.

The trial Court ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the civil case relying principally upon Roa vs Dela Cruz, 107 Phil 8;

When the offended party actually intervenes in the criminal action by appearing therein through a private prosecutor for the purpose of recovering indemnity for damages, he is deemed to have waived his right to file a separate civil action for damages if he failed to make a reservation therefor; thus, if the court did not enter a judgment for civil liability against the accused in the criminal case because the offended party failed to submit evidence of damages therein and he did not file any motion for reconsideration or did not appeal from said judgment, the judgment becomes res judicata, and an independent civil action under Art. 33 of the New Civil Code cannot be brought by said offended party anymore

ISSUE:

Whether or not the rule laid down in Roa Case should govern in dismissing the civil case filed by Zenaida Cruz Reyes.

HELD:

No. In the present case, however, while it is true that petitioner, the aggrieved party in the criminal case against private respondent Cristina Malicsi for the crime of intriguing against honor, was represented by a private prosecutor for the purpose of proving damages, the unexpected plea of guilt by the accused and her being sentenced immediately to a fine of P50.00 prevented petitioner from proving her claim for damages and making a reservation to file a separate civil action. More in point, therefore, is the case of Meneses vs. Luat, 12 SCRA 454, and it is the ruling in the said case rather than the Roa case which is controlling in the present case, Like in the present case in the Meneses case the aggrieved party was also represented by a private prosecutor, but the case did not proceed to trial as the accused upon arraignment pleaded guilty.

Upon authority, therefore, of Meneses vs. Luat We find and so hold that the mere appearance of a private prosecutor in the criminal case against the herein private respondents did not necessarily constitute such intervention on the part of the aggrieved party as could only import an intention on her part to press her claim for damages in said criminal case and a waiver of her right to file a separate civil action for damages. Because the accused had pleaded guilty upon arraignment and was immediately sentenced, there was no chance for the aggrieved party to present evidence in support of her claim for damages and to enter a reservation in the record to file a separate civil action.

Moreover, the failure of petitioner to make a reservation to file a separate civil action did not foreclose her right to file said separate complaint for damages. Under Article 33 of the Civil Code there is no requirement that as a condition to the filing of a separate civil action for damages a reservation to file said civil action be first made in the criminal case and such reservation is not necessary.

Outcome of criminal case is inconsequential.

The outcome or result of the criminal case, whether an acquittal or conviction, is inconsequential and will be of no moment in a civil action for damages based on Article 33 of the Civil Code.

Civil liability may still be pursued in a separate civil action but it must be predicated on a source of obligation other than a delict, except when by statutory provision an independent civil action is authorized such as, to exemplify, in the instance enumerated in Article 33 of the Civil Code.

Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.
[By: Lance Joseph Abad]

A person is being held- up. A police officer refused to help him despite pleas for help or protection, as a consequence of which the personal belongings of the person were taken. Such police officer is liable primarily for damages and the city or municipality is liable subsidiarily.

If the act of police officer constitutes a crime, any civil action that may be filed shall be independent of any criminal proceedings. Preponderance of evidence shall be sufficient to support a decision in such action.

The reason why a police officer is liable in case he refuses to give help or protection to anyone whose life or property is in danger is that he is usually the person to whom people turn to for protection. To the people, the policeman is the external symbol of the government’s power and authority.

Article 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complainant may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant’s motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If during the pendency of the civil action, information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.

[By: Kristia Capio]

RESERVATION OF CIVIL ACTION

This provision fall under Rule 111 of the Rules of Court sets out the procedure with respect to the reservations in criminal cases with respect to the civil liability of the accused.

Rule 111 – Prosecution of Civil Action

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.

(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal action.

Section 2. When separate civil action is suspended.

After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last until fi nal judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently.

In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

Section 4. Effect of death on civil actions.

The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.

A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.

If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the deceased.

Section 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar.

A final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is not a bar to a criminal action against the defendant for the same act or omission subject of the civil action.

Case:

HAMBON vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND CARANTES

G.R. No. 122150. March 17, 2003

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

FACTS:

George Hambon filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio on June 6, 1989, Civil Case No. 1761-R, a complaint for damages for the injuries and expenses he received after the truck driven by Valentino Carantes bumped him on the night of December 9, 1985. The respondent opposed that the criminal case arising from the same incident, Criminal Case No. 2049 for Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence, previously filed on January 8, 1986, had already been dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Tuba, Benguet on March 23, 1987, due to petitioners lack of interest and that the dismissal was with respect to both civil and criminal liabilities of the respondent.

Subsequently, the Regional Trial Court decided that the civil case was not barred by the dismissal of the criminal case, and that petitioner is entitled to damages. However, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the trial court, and dismissed petitioner’s complaint for damages. According to the appellate court, since the petitioner did not make any reservation for a separate civil action for damages, it was impliedly instituted with the criminal case, and the dismissal of the criminal case carried with it the dismissal of the suit for damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a civil case for damages based on an independent civil action be duly dismissed for failure to make reservation of separate civil action in a criminal case filed, due to the fact that the criminal case was dismissed before the prosecution started to present evidence for failure of the private complainant to appear despite notice.

RULING:

The Court explained that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, or else they will be considered to have been instituted with the criminal case. Otherwise speaking, the right of the injured party to charge separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether from crimes or from quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be considered instituted with the criminal action.

Opposing to private respondent’s argument, the requirement that before a separate civil action may be brought it must be reserved does not diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only controls their exercise in the general interest of procedure. The requirement is merely procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art. 100 that any person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable, provides the offended party the right to bring a separate civil action, however no one has ever questioned the rule that such action must be reserved before it may be brought separately.

Therefore, the petitioner George Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute the civil action for damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. In his failure to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damages later filed by him without prior reservation should be dismissed. With the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2049, whatever civil action for the recovery of civil liability that was impliedly instituted therein was likewise dismissed.

Article 36. Prejudicial Questions, which must be decided first before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by the Rules of Court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.

[By: Janine May T. Gumangol]

Concept:

Prejudicial Question is a question which arises in a case, the resolution of which arises is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.

Principle

Avoid conflicting decisions.

Elements of Prejudicial Questions

The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;

The resolution of such issue in the civil action determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed (Sec. 5, Rule 111, Rules of Court)

Action for the nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question to a concubinage case.

Annulment of a certificate of sale not a prejudicial question in a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession.

An action for rescission of a contract is not prejudicial in an action based on B.P. Blg.22

Partition case is a prejudicial question to a criminal case for violation of P.D. No. 772

Case:

People Versus Aragon

FACTS:

Allen forced Brenda to marry him. Brenda filed an action for annulment of marriage on the ground of force or intimidation. During the pendency of the annulment case, Allen married Carol; hence, Allen was charged with bigamy. He filed a motion to suspend the criminal action on the ground of prejudicial question.

ISSUE:

HELD:

The motion is not proper. If the cause for invalidity of the marriage is due to his own malfeasance, he cannot avail of it to defeat the criminal case. In this case, it was Allen who forced Brenda to marry him; hence, he created the caused for the invalidity of the marriage.

BOOK I

PERSONS

Title I. - CIVIL RESPONSIBILITY

Chapter 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.

[By: Lacky Charlie Ramos]

JURIDICAL CAPACITY

it is the capacity of every person since the day that he/she was born.
inherent

Example:

every person has the right to inherent or to receive a donation. He/she was a passive subject.

CAPACITY TO ACT

It is the capacity of a person to act when he/she was at the legal age.
Merely acquired

Example:

A, 25 y/o entered to a marriage to B who was also 25 y/o. A and B need to be at the legal age before they have the power to do acts.

Concepts:

1. Juridical capacity is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations it is inherent in every natural person.

2. Capacity to act is the power to do acts with legal effect. It may be acquired and it may also be lost. It is acquired upon the attainment of the age of majority.

3. Person is a physical or legal being susceptible of rights and obligations or of being the subject of legal relations.

4. Right is the power which a person has to demand from another a prestation or the power to do or not to do, or to demand something.

Elements of a right:

Subject

Rights exist in favor of persons. Every right involves two persons, one who may demand its enforcement, being consequently designated as the active subject, and the other must suffer or obey such enforcement and is therefore called the passive subject. The former has a right; the latter owes a duty.

Object

Rights are exercised over things, or services, for the satisfaction of human wants, physical or spiritual. Things and services constitute the object of rights.

Efficient Cause

This is the tie that binds the subject and the object together. It produces all legal relations. It springs mainly from acts of violation.

Example:

Pedro sold his house and lot to Juan for P500, 000.00. They signed to an absolute deed of sale. Pedro and Juan were the passive and active subjects. The house and lot were be the object and the amount P500, 000.00 was the efficient cause.

JURIDICAL CAPASITY DISTINGUISHED FROM CAPACITY TO ACT

The first term as defined in this is the fitness of man to be the subject of legal relations. Capacity to act, on the other hand, is the power to do acts with juridical effect. the first is an inherent and ineffaceable attribute of man; it attaches to him by the mere fact of his being a man and is lost only through death. the second, that is capacity to act, is acquired and may be lost. The former can exist without the latter, but the existence of the latter always implies that the former. The Union of this two is the full civil capacity.

Case:

FLORENDO, et al. vs HON. PERPETUA COLOMA et al., 129 SCRA 304

FACTS:

Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) warded Adela Salindon a parcel of land located at Diliman Q. C. last July 1969 but there were an occupants to the said parcel of land. (Mr. William Vasquez and Erlinda Nicolas). Miss Salindon filed a complaint for ejectment against the occupants. Allegedly, Mr. Vasquez and Ms. Nicolas occupying her property. According to Mr. Vasquez and Ms. Nicolas, they had been continuous, open, adverse and actual possession and occupation of the lot since 1950. The PHHC said that they have not any acquired vested right over the said property. After trial, the court issued a descision favor to Mr. Vasquez and Ms. Nicolas. Ms. Salindon appealed then later on, she died. Counsel of Salindon failed to inform the court of her death. Her heirs settled her state and the subject lot was transferred with a new Transfer Certificate of Title to the petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the death of Adela Salindon Extinguished her civil personalit

HELD:

NO, under section 17, rule 3 of the rules of curt provides; after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased within a period of 30 days or within such time as may be granted.

Under section 16, rule 3 of the rules of court provides; whenever a party to apending case dies, it shall be the duty of his attorner to inform the court promptly of such death and to give the name and the residence of the executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative of the deceased.

The court order to annul TCT nos. 138007 and 239729. All issued by the respondent city court are nullified and set aside for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion insofar as the private respondents were concerned. The National Housing Authority was declared the owner of the said parcel of land and directed to took possession of the same and to either hold or dispose of it according to law and this decision.

Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements. (32a)

[By: Richard Ramos]

There are persons who have restricted capacity to act, like minors, insane, imbeciles, deaf-mutes, prodigals, or those under civil interdiction. Such conditions merely restrict their capacity to act. They, however, have juridical capacity and are susceptible of rights and even of obligations, when the same arise from their acts or from property relations. These persons are not exempted from their obligations. Their parents or guardians may still be liable.

Article 39: The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency, and trusteeship.

[By: Evita Teope]

A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all civil acts of civil life, except in cases specified by law. (As repealed by the Family Code and RA 6809, where the age of majority now is 18 years.)

This article includes not only provide the restrictions or limitations but also those circumstances that modify the capacity to act under the law.

The consequences of the circumstances of these are governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. It also asserts that the capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.

Restrictions on the capacity to act:

1. Minority/Age: The age of majority is 18 years. (RA 6809). Therefore, minors cannot give consent to contracts.

Illustration 1:

If A and B are both minors. A sold his car to B for 400, 000.00. A delivered it and B paid. The contract is unenforceable.

Article 1403 of the New Civil Code NCC, one of the classics of an unenforceable contract is where both parties are incompetent to give consent. But the contract can be cleansed of its defect when their parents or guardians ratify the same. (Art. 1407, NCC)

Illustration 2:

A minor sold his car to B, a person of age. B paid A and A delivered the car to B. This contract is voidable.

If one of the parties to a contract is incapable of giving consent, the contract is voidable(Art. 1390, NCC). But if the parents or guardian of the said incompetent party would ratify the same, it is cleansed of its defect from the moment of signing or perfection of the contract of the minor.

In both cases, there is a restriction of capacity to act, yet the law recognizes effects of the said contracts.

Mercado and Mercado v. Espiritu, 37 Phils. 215, minors stated that they were of legal age when they entered into a contract of sale. The truth is that they were not of legal age. They could not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of their obligation. This is so because of the principle of estoppel.

Case:

Domingo Mercado and Josefa Mercado, plaintiffs-appellants, v. Jose Espiritu, administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu, defendant-appellee, G.R. No. L-11872, December 1, 1917

Perfecto Salas Rodriguez for appellants.

Vicente Foz for defendant-appellee.

FACTS:

This is an appeal by the bill of exceptions, filed by the counsel for the plaintiffs from the judgment of September 22, 2018, in which the judge of the Seventh Judicial District dismissed the complaint filed by the plaintiffs and order them to keep perpetual silence in regard to the litigated land, and to pay costs of the suit.

By a complaint dated April 9, 1913, counsel for Domingo and Josefa Mercado brought suit in the Court of First Instance (now RTC) of Bulacan, against Luis Espiritu, but, as the latter died soon thereafter, the complaint was amended by being directed against Jose Espiritu in his capacity of his administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu.

Luis Espiritu entered into a contract of sale with the heirs of his sister Margarita: Domingo and Josefa Mercado, who pretended to be of legal age to give their consent to a contract of sale of the land that they inherited from their Mother Margarita.

The siblings Domingo and Josefa sought for the annulment of the said contract alleging that they were of minor age during the perfection of contract.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of sale is valid when the minors presented themselves to be of legal age at the time of perfection of the contract.

RULING:

The Court ruled that the contract of sale is VALID even if it were made and entered into by minors, who pretended to be of legal age.

The ruling was in accordance with the provisions of the law on the doctrine of estoppel and sec. 6 (a) Rule 123 which states that 'Whenever a party has, in its declaration, an act or an omission, intentionally or deliberately led another party to believe a particular thing to be true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising of such declaration, be permitted to falsify it.'

Furthermore, the sale of the real estate made by a minor who pretended to be of legal age, when in fact, he is not, is VALID, and he will not be permitted to excuse himself from the fulfilment of the obligations contracted by him or to have it annulled. The judgment that holds such sale to be valid and absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against him does not violate laws relative to the sale of minor's property, nor the judicial rules established in consonance therewith.

The fact that a minor at the time of entering into a contract falsely represented to the person with whom he dealt that he had attained the age of majority will create an estoppel against the infant/minor, the other party had a good reason to believe that the minor is capable of contracting.

2. Sickness

An insane or demented person or a deaf-mute who does not know how to read and write may not give consent to a contract (Art. 1372 [2] NCC).

3. Penalty

During the service of a sentence of an accused by imprisonment of 12 yrs & 1 day or more, the court may limit the accused's capacity to act or deprive him of some of his rights herein referred to as Civil Interdiction (the state of deprivation by the court of a person’s right)

Civil Interdiction deprives the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of :

a. Parental and/or marital authority;

b. Guardianship to person or property;

c. The right to manage his property;

d. The right to dispose of such property by any act or conveyance (i.e. he cannot donate) inter vivos.

4. Prodigality

The state of squandering money or property with a morbid desire to prejudice the heirs of a person.

5. Alienage

Aliens cannot acquire land in the Philippines

No private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold land of public domain. (Sec. 7, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution)

(Cheesman v. CA- a foreigner who marries a Filipino and out of conjugal funds, a private property is acquired, such cannot form part of their community of property because the foreigner is disqualified from acquiring lands in the Phils. Dura lex sed lex

6. Absence

When a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, he is considered as absent [Art. 382 NCC]. The court can appoint an administrator at the instance of an interested person, a relative or a friend. However, it is not absolute such that the person may still recover his rights should he appear. In fact, if someone can prove that he acquired the title over his properties under administration, the administration would cease.

7. Insolvency or trusteeship

If declared insolvent, one cannot dispose of his properties existing at the time of the commencement of the proceedings for insolvency.

No payments of property or credit can be made to him (Sections 18 and 24, Act No. 56)

8. Family Relations

By reason of public policy, where the possibility that one may exert undue influence over the other, the ff restrictions are applied:

A husband and wife cannot donate to one another. This extends to the common-law relationship (Art. 87, family code); or cannot sell to one another, as a rule, except in cases where they are governed by complete separation of property regime or when there is the separation of properties during the marriage;

Husband and wife cannot enter into a universal partnership of all properties (Art. 1782, NCC)

The law also declares the following void marriages:

a. Those contracted among relatives in the direct line, whether legitimate or illegitimate (Art.37 Family Code); or

b. Those in the collateral line up to the fourth civil degree of consanguinity (Art. 38, Family Code).

9. Deaf-mute

A person who is blind or deaf cannot be a witness in a will (Art. 820 NCC)

But a deaf-mute may execute a will (Art. 807, NCC) or

A blind person can execute a will ( Art. 808, NCC)

On the other hand, POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS BELIEF does not affect the capacity to act. In fact, sec. 5, Art. III, 1987 Constitution provides that no religious test is required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Chapter 2

NATURAL PERSONS

Article 40. Birth determine personality but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided, it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. (29a)

[By: Noel Viray]

Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb? However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a)

[By: Venancio C. Estabillo]

The fetus is considered born after its complete separation from the maternal womb, that is, the cutting of the umbilical cord.

Illustration:

1. A executed a will instituting the fetus inside B’s womb. At the time of the child’s birth, he had an intra-uterine life of 8 months. In order to succeed, he must be considered born; and if he is born alive, he succeeds and he would transmit successional rights to his heirs if he should die after his birth.

2. Supposed the child had an intra-uterine life of 6-1/2 months or less than 7 months, he must have to live for atleast 24 hours from the complete separation from the maternal womb, otherwise, if he dies within 24 hours from his complete separation from the maternal womb; then, he would not inherit and transmit successional rights to his heirs.

3. Supposed A and B are married. They have a son C, who is married to D, and they have a son E. A executed a will instituting C, but the latter predeceased his father, A. E can inherit by right of representation.

Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. (32a)

[By: Rose Ann C. Villanueva]

Death defined.

A permanent cessation of all vital functions (Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary)

Civil death

State of person who, though possessing a life has lost all his civil rights.

Rights to succession

Transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.

What happens after death?

1. Dissolution of the absolute community of properties and the conjugal partnerships
2. Extinguishment of parental authority.
3. If a person constitutes another as an agent, the death of the principal or the agent extinguishes the agency.
4. If penalty has been imposed upon a person, his death extinguishes such penalty; not prejudice to the liability of the estate in case the obligation arose out of other sources of obligations.
5. Estate of a decedent is in law regarded as a person; that the supervening death of a person does not extinguish his civil personality.

Case:

People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova

G.R. No. L-102007. September 2, 1994

Romero, J.

FACTS:

Rogelio Bayota was charged with rape and eventually convicted on June 19, 1991. Bayota died on February 4, 1992 while appeal on his conviction was still pending. On May 20, 1992 the Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Bayota's civil liability be extinguished after his death.

RULING:

Yes. In the same way when the Supreme Court dismissed Bayota’s criminal case (Art. 89 RPC), the civil liability that arose from the same criminal liability shall be likewise extinguished.

Article 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to other. (33)

[By: Aneleth Anjolyn B. Valencia]

There must be a showing that there is a death by positive evidence. However, it can be done by circumstantial evidence.

In Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil 257, where the death of the mother and her son occurred during the massacre of civilians in February 1945 and at the time when Manila was being bombarded during the war, The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the trial court which was reversed by the Court of Appeals that, from the evidence presented the son died ahead of mother.

Case:

RAMON JOAQUIN vs. ANTONIO C. NAVARRO

G.R No. L-5426, May 29, 1953

FACTS:

On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro Sr. aged 70, Angela Joaquin aged 67, with their three daughters, Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad and their son Joaquin Navarro Jr. aged 30 and his wife Adela Conde sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as German Club. During their stay the club was set on fire and Japanese started shooting at the people inside the building, which hit the three daughters and fell of the ground near the entrance.

Joaquin Navarro Sr., his son Joaquin Navarro Jr with his wife Adela Conde, friend and former neighbor Francisco Lopez decided to abandon the premises but could not convince Angela Joaquin to join them. They dashed out of the burning edifice and as they came out, Joaquin Navarro Jr was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the German Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably including Angela Joaquin.

Joaquin Navarro Sr., Adela Joaquin and Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby. They stayed there about three days until they are forced to leave the shelter because the shelling tore it open. But unfortunately met Japanese Patrols, who fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro Sr and his daughter-in-law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Angela Joaquin Navarro died before her son Joaquin Navarro Jr or vice versa as it radically affects the rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin (petitioner) who was an acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro (respondent), son of Joaquin Navarro Sr., by first marriage.

HELD:

The testimony of Francisco Lopez contains facts adequate to solve the problem of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed that in light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable interference can be arrived at, namely; that Joaquin Navarro Jr, died before his mother.

This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well give an idea, at the same time, of a condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the moment her husband, son, and daughter-in-law left her. It strongly tends to prove that, as the situation looked to her, the perils of death from staying were not so imminent. And it lends credence to Mr. Lopez' statement that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the head and dropped dead, and that it was the collapse that killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. The Court of Appeals said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death and the breaking down of the edifice was "minutes". Even so, it was much longer than five seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that Mrs. Angela Joaquin was sill alive when her son expired.

In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is based purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. The opposite theory — that the mother outlived her son — is deduced from established facts which, weighed by common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by, which civil cases are decided, this inference ought to prevail. It cannot be defeated as in an instance, cited by Lord Chief Justice Kenyon, "bordering on the ridiculous, where in an action on the game laws it was suggested that the gun with which the defendant fired was not charged with shot, but that the bird might have died in consequence of the fright." (1 Moore on Facts, 63, citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.)

Illustration:

A and B, father and son, died on the same day but the exact hours of their death cannot be ascertained. Then, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights, one in favor of another.

However, if it can be established that A died ahead of B, then B can inherit from A, but since he is already dead, his heirs can represent him.

Similar presumption in Rule 131, Section 3, paragraph (jj) of the Rules of Court, which provides:

“That except for purposes of succession when two persons perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes, according to the following rules:

1. If both were under the age of 15 years, the older is presumed to have survived;

2. If both were above the age of 60, the younger is deemed to have survived;

3. If one is under 15 and the other above 60, the former is deemed to have survived;

4. If both be over 15 and under 60, and the sex be different, the male is deemed to have survived; if the sex be the same, the older;

5. If one be under 15 or over 60, and the other between those ages, the latter is deemed to have survived.”

Chapter 3

NATURAL PERSONS

Article 44. The following are juridicial persons:

1. The State and its political subdivisions;

2. Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;

3. Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridicial personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member. (35a).

[By: Lance Joseph Abad]

A juridical person is an abstract being, formed for the realization of collective purpose, to which the law has granted capacity for rights and obligations.

The law classifies juridical person into three:

The state and its political subdivisions
Entities for public interests or purposes
Entities for private interest or purposes

A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law having the right of succession and the powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence.

Corporations may be public or private. Public corporations are those formed or organized for the government of the State. Private corporations are those formed for some private purposes, benefit, aim or end.

Public corporations may also be classified into stock and non-stock. Stock corporations are those which have a capital stock divided into shares and are authorized to distribute to the holders of such shares dividends or allotments of the surplus on the basis of the shares held. All other private corporations are non-stock corporations.

Case:

Barlin v. Ramirez, et al., 7 Phil. 41

FACTS:

Priests were already been in existence in the Municipality of Lagonoy since 1839. January 13, 1869 the church and convent were burned. They were rebuilt between 1870 and 1873. Rebuilding process were ordered by the Governor and was the laborers were the people from the barangay as per the order of the Cabeza De Barangay. The materials and funds that were used on the renovation were from the parish priests funds. 1st day of November, 1904, the municipality of Lagonoy filed a petition asking that it be allowed to intervene in the case and join with the defendant, Ramirez, as a defendant therein. This petition been granted, the municipality of the 1st day of December filed an answer in which it alleged that the defendant, Ramirez, was in possession of the property described in the complaint under the authority and with the consent of the municipality of Lagonoy and that such municipality was the owner thereof. Plaintiff answered this complaint, or answer in intervention, and the case was tried and final judgment in entered therein in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants.

ISSUE:

Whether or not that the subject property wherein the said church situated were own by the government or by the Catholic Church having the capacity as Juridical Personality.

HELD:

The court decided to hold its decision in favor of the Catholic Church because of its Juridical Personality here in the Philippines, The Church belongs to God and therefore the use of the Church should be to glorify God which is the Catholic Church used to do. The public properties are the Roads and other properties wherein the public should have. The Ownership of the Churches in the Philippines is not covered by the treaty of Paris which were contracted between U.S. and Spain

Article 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are governed by the laws creating or recognizing them.

Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject.

Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the provisions of this Code concerning partnerships.

[By: Kristia Capio]

The State is governed by the provisions of the 1987 Constitution; provinces and municipalities are governed by the Local Government Code; and chartered cities by their respective charters. Corporations created by special charter are governed primarily by such charter; and those created under general law are governed by the Corporation Code. Partnerships and associations must be governed primarily by their contracts of association, and only secondarily by law, because partnerships are created by contract, and it is a fundamental rule that the contract has the force of law between the contracting parties.

DETERMINATION OF NATIONALITY OF JURIDICAL PERSONS

The nationality of a corporation is usually determined by the place of its incorporation. So if incorporated in the Philippines, it is a Philippine corporation. There is an exception may for certain purposes be made for this rule, for the grant of the rights in the Constitution to the operation of public utilities, and for the acquisition of land and other natural resources, a corporation, even if incorporated here, cannot acquire said rights unless 60% of its capital be Philippine-owned.

Case:

CONVERSE RUBBER CORPORATION vs. UNIVERSAL RUBBER PRODUCTS, INC. AND TIBURCIO S. EVALLE, DIRECTOR OF PATENTS

G.R. No. L-27906 January 8, 1987

FERNAN, J.

FACTS:

Respondent Universal Rubber Products applied for the registration of the trademark “Universal Converse and Device” used on its rubber shoes and rubber slippers. Petitioner Converse Rubber Corporation filed its disapproval on the grounds that the trademark sought to be registered was similar to the word “Converse” which is part of its corporate name “Converse Rubber Corporation” and it will possibly deceived purchasers and cause irreversible injury to its reputation in the Philippines. Respondent declared that petitioner is a company organized under United States laws not licensed to do business in the Philippines and not doing business on its own in the Philippines. The Director Patents gave due course to respondent’s application. Motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a foreign corporation not licensed to do business and is not actually doing business in the Philippines can maintain an action, suit or proceeding.

RULING:

The respondent Director of Patents was wrong on his conclusion that since the petitioner is not licensed to do business in the Philippines and is actually not doing business on its own in the country, it has no name to protect, therefore, it is useless for it to established that “CONVERSE” as part of its corporate name. However, it was spoken many times by the Court. A foreign corporation has a right to uphold an action even if it is not licensed to do business and is not actually doing business on its own. In La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez, this Court, reiterating Western Equipment and Supply Co. vs. Reyes, stated that:

… a foreign corporation which has never done any business in the Philippines and which is unlicensed and unregistered to do business here, but is widely and favorably known in the Philippines through the use therein of its products bearing its corporate and tradename, has a legal right to maintain an action in the Philippines to restrain the residents and inhabitants thereof from organizing a corporation therein bearing the same name as the foreign corporation, when it appears that they have personal knowledge of the existence of such a foreign corporation, and it is apparent that the purpose of the proposed domestic corporation is to deal and trade in the same goods as those of the foreign corporation.

The ruling of the Supreme Court was that the respondent Universal Rubber Products, Inc.’s application for registration of the trademark “UNIVERSAL CONVERSE AND DEVICE” on its rubber shoes and slippers was denied.

Article 46. Juridical Persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds, as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organizations.

[By: Janine May T. Gumangol]

Juridical Persons may;

Acquire properties.

They may enter into contracts.

Without such capacity, they cannot fulfil or attain their aims. They may sue or be sued but they cannot be prosecuted criminally. The officers may, however, be prosecuted criminally.

ARTICLE 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations, institutions and other entities for public interest or purpose mentioned in no. 2 of article 44, their property and other assets shall be disposed of the pursuance of law or charter creating them. If nothing has been specified on this point, the benefit of the region, province or municipality which during the existence of the institution derived the principal benefits from the same. (39a)

[By: Lacky Charlie Ramos]

If an Institution or Corporation had been dissolved, the properties and their assets will be distribute according to what their charter or to their signed contract, but if there were no charter to a Corporation or Institution, their assets and properties shall be applied to similar purposes for the benefit of the region, province, city or municipality which during the existence of the institution or corporation derived from the principal benefits from the same.

In reality, every Institution or Corporation has their Charter and upon the dissolution their properties and assets were distributed according to their charter

Title II. - CITIZENSHIP AND DOMICILE

Article 48. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

[By: Richard Ramos]

1. Those who were citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines;

2. Those born in the Philippines of foreign parents who, before the adoption of said Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippines;

3. Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;

4. Those whose mothers are the citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age majority, elect Philippine citizenship;

5. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. (n)

Article 49. Naturalization and the loss and requisition citizenship of the Philippines are governed by special laws. (n)

[By: Richard Ramos]

Citizenship is the membership in a political community which more or less permanent in nature.

Citizenship is membership in a democratic or political community, while nationality is membership in any political community whether monarchical, autocratic or democratic. Citizenship follows the exercise of civil and political rights, while nationality does not necessarily carry with it the exercise of political rights. A person can be a citizen of one country and a national of another.

There are three (3) modes of acquiring citizenship:

1. Jus Sanguinis, meaning by blood: as when a child is born of parents who are both Filipinos, wherever he may be born.

2. Jus Soli, which means by place of birth. So that if a Filipino couple gives birth to a child in a place which adheres to the principle of jus soli, then the child is a citizen of such place, like the USA which recognizes the principle of jus soli.

3. Naturalization, which is an artificial means of process, wether judicial or administrative, by which a state places the imprint of a native citizen wherein it adopts an aien and gives him the imprint and endowment of a citizen of that country.

The first group of citizens enumerated in the Constitution constitute the largest group, as they comprise those who were citizens of the Philippines on February 2, 1987, or at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. Included are the following.

a. Those who were citizens under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916;

b. Those who were naturalized as Filipinos prior to the adoption of the 1935 Constitution;

c. Those who have been declared as Filipino citizens by final judgement

d. Those who had elected Philippine citizenship;

e. Those born in the Philippines of foreign parents and had been elected to public office before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution.

Under the Jones Law of 1916 and the Philippine Bill of 1902,the following Spanish subjects became citizens of the Philippine under the conditions set forth therein:

· “The Jones Law and the Philippine Bill both provided that “all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the 11^th day of April, 1899, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed in Paeis, December Tenth,1898, and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country.”

· If a person was born prior to January 17, 1973, of Filipino mother, and upon reaching the age of majority, he elected Philippine citizenship, he is a Filipino citizen. This law refers to those born under the old Constitutions (1935 and 1973 Constitutions). The mother must be a Filipino and the father must be a foreigner, because if the father is a Filipino, then the rule is inapplicable. During the minority of the child, he is a foreigner that is why, he is given the privilege or right to elect Philippine citizenship within a reasonable period of time upon reaching the age of minority. As a matter of fact, when such child elects Philippine citizenship, the effect even retroacts to the date of his birth because the Constitution says that those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3. Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution shall be deemed natural born citizens (Sec 2, Art IV, 1987 Constitution). Election of Philippine citizenship can be expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any official who is authorized to administer an oath. The statement must be filed with the nearest Local Civil Registry. The statement must be accompanied by an Oath of Allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines (Sec 1, CA 625).

Qualifications of an alien before he can be naturalized.

An applicant for naturalization must have the following qualifications:

1. Age. He must be at least 21 years of age at the date of the election:

2. Residence for 10 years or more in the Philippines;

3. Good moral character in that he should have conducted himself in an irreproachable manner during his stay;

4. Property qualification. He must have some lucrative trade, prefession or calling;

5. Education. He must be able to speak, speak, write English or Spanish or a principal dialect. He must have enrolled his children in a recognized school in the Philippines which teaches Philippine history, civics and government.

How the 10-year residence requirement is reduced.

The 10-year residence requirement for an applicant for naturalizations may be reduced if:

1. He was born in the Philippines

2. He is married to a Filipino

3. He served in the government or held an office

4. He has served as a teacher in a private or public school not limited to children of any nationality in any branch of education;

5. He made a useful investment or industry in the Philippines.

Disqualifications.

An alien who files a petition for naturalization may be disqualified when he:

1. Is opposed to organized government;

2. Is believer in violence as a means to expose an idea;

3. Is a polygamist or believe in polygamy

4. Has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;

5. Has an incurable disease;

6. Has not mingled socially with Filipinos or he has not embraced Filipino cultures, ideals and customs;

7. Is a citizen of a country with which the Philippines is at during the time of such war;

8. Is a citizen or national of a country which does not grant same naturalizations to Filipinos (no reciprocity)

The declaration of the intention to file a petition for naturalization is not, however, absolute. There are exceptions, like:

1. When he was born in the Philippines and received his primary and secondary education in the Philippines;

2. When he resided in the Philippines for 30 years;

3. When he is the widow or child of the applicant who died before approval of the application.

If one who is not exempted from filing the required declaration of intention files an invalid declaration of intention files an invalid declaration, he can be denaturalized. The reason is obvious. Naturalization is a matter of privilege.

Concept of derivative naturalization.

· It is one which says that if the husband of an alien woman is naturalized the wife follows the Filipino citizenship of the husband provided she does not passes any of the disqualifications (Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Comm. Of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292 (1971). The rule is likewise true even if both spouses are foreigners and the man became a naturalized Filipino. The woman ipso facto acquires the citizenship of the naturalized husband provided that she does not possess any of the disqualifications to become a citizen of the Philippines. The law does not require that the woman should possess the qualifications of becoming a Filipino. If she falls under the principle, she must file a petition for cancellation of her alien certificate of registration, alleging that she is not disqualified from acquiring Philippine citizenship under Section 4 of the Naturalization Law. The petition must be accompanied by an affidavit of the petitioner and her husband that she does not belong to the group of disqualified persons and that she must file the petition with the Bureau of Immigration.

Commonwealth Act No. 63 enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost, like:

1. Naturalization in a foreign country;

2. Express renunciation of citizenship;

Subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country

· For a Filipino who lost his Filipino citizenship to reacquire it, there must be direct act of Congress or naturalization or repatriation. If there is repatriation the effect is retroactive from the moment of birth (Bengzon v. HRET). Hence,it as if he never lost his status as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Founding born in the Philippines, a natural born citizen.

In Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamansares v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 221697;221698-700, March 8, 2016, Perez, J, the Supreme court has written finis to the controversial issue on the citizenship of Sen. Grace Poe. In fact, the court said that “the questioned Resolutions of the Comelec in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits. “It ruled that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

Sen. Grace Poe is admittedly founding. Is she a natural-born citizen of the Philippines?

HELD: Yes, a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. In the words of Chief Justice Fernando, “the constitution is not silently silent, it is silently vocal. In fact, there is nothing in the 1935, 1973, 1987 Constitution for an express intention to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to deny the use of the Constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the Constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board marginalization (Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamansares v. Comelec, et al., G.R. Nos. 221697; 221698-700, March 8,2016, Perez, J).

No provisions of the Constitution discriminate against foundlings.

· There are no provisions in the Constitution with intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings.Special consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the “State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights,” Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to “give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x” and article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the “right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse,cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.” Certainly these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status ({Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanares v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 221697; 221698-700, March 8, 2016, Perez, J}

Other provisions of Philippines law that would support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted.Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic, 117 Phil. 976 {1963}, a child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. The court said:

In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latter’s nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.

Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled “An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes” {otherwise known as the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes” (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court’s A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the “Rule on Adoption.” All expressly refer to “Filipino children” and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted (Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamansares v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 221697; 221698-700, March 8, 2016, Perez, J).

It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. Is the contention correct? The SC said:

This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 “Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippines citizenship.”In the first place, “having to perform an act” means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship f the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filpino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.

Under the provisions of Section 5 of the RA No. 8552 it shall be the duty of the Department or the child-caring agency which has custody of the child to exert all efforts to locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such efforts fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings where he/she shall be declared abandoned(Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamansares v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 221697; 221698-700, March 8, 2016, Perez, J).

What is the status of foundlings under international law? Explain.

· Foundlings are citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitutions, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation (Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 621 Phil. 536,600 (2009) citing Pharmaceutical and Health care Assoc. of the Philippines v. Duque III, 561 Phil. 386, 398 (2007). On the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations (Article 38.1, paragraphs (b) and (c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice). International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existenece of a rule of law requiring it (Mijares v. Ranada, 495 Phil. 372, 395 (2005). “ General principles of law recognized by civilized nations” are principles “ established by a process of reasoning” or judicial logic, based on principles which are “ basic to legal systems generally.” (Pharmaceutical and Health Care Assoc. of the Philippines v. Duque III 561 Phil 386, 400 (2007) such as “general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, “ and the “general principle against discrimination: which is embodied in the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation” These are the same core principles which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.

Specific provisions of the UDHR UNCRC NCCPR that support the view that Sen. Grace Poe is a citizen of the Philippines under International Law.

· Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) has been interpreted by the Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. 130 Article 15 thereof states:

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

· The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCC imposes the following obligations on our country:

1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.

Two conventions which grant citizenship to foundlings but they have not been ratified by the Philippines: effect.

The principles found in two conventions, while yet ungratified by the Philippines are generally accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the “nationality of the country of birth,” to wit:

· A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child’s parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.

· A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found.

· The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. It provides that a foundling found in the territory of a Contraction State shall, in the absence of a proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.

· That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15 (1) of which 131 effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 “ United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness” merely “gives effect” to Article 15 (1) of the UDHR. In Razon v. Tagitis, it was held that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the “International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.” Yet, the proscription against enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as a “generally accepted principle of international law.” Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the ban as a generally accepted principle of international law although the convention had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not even come into force and which needed the ratification of a minimum of twenty states.

· The approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that “ generally accepted principles of international law” are based not only on international custom, but also on “ general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,” as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph © of the Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which are “basic to legal systems generally,” support the notion that the right against enforced disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly considered as “ generally accepted principles of international law” under the incorporation clause.

Article 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfilment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence.

[By: Evita Teope]

The domicile of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence.

There are two (2) elements of domicile:

1.The fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place;

2. The intention to remain permanently or animus manendi

The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile and in case of disagreement, the court shall decide (Art. 69 Family Code). The Family Code abrogated the inequality between husband and wife where the husband, under the old law, fixes or dictates the domicile of the wife. It was gender-based discrimination and not rationally related to the objective of family solidarity.

But the court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if:

1. the latter should live abroad;

2. there are other compelling reasons for the exemption.

There distinctions between the domicile and the residence: "A residence is not a domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intent of returning.”

A residence is a place of abode; permanent or temporary; a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes; and involves the intent to leave as soon the purpose is established.

A domicile, on the other hand, is a fixed permanent residence, to which, when one absent, one has the intention of returning (Imelda R Marcos v. COMELEC, et al, GR No. 119976, Sept. 18, 1995).

The important points in domicile have to be noted:

1. A domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained.

2. Domicile is not lost even if one has lived and maintained residences in different places for some purposes, without having had the intention to abandon it by reason of occupation, profession, etc., shall not be deemed to have lost his original residence.

In matters of domicile, a minor follows the domicile of his parents. In the case of Imelda R. Marcos v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995, it was said that a domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained. In spite of her having born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte is her place of domicile of origin by operation of law. This was not established only when she reached the age of 18 years old, but when his father brought his family back to Leyte. Domicile is not easily lost.

To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:

1. an actual removal or change of domicile;

2. a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3. acts which correspond with the purpose.

Case:

Imelda R. Marcos v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995

FACTS:

Imelda R. Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte stating, among others, her residence in the place was seven (7) months. Cong. Cirilo Roy Montejo, another candidate, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification of with the COMELEC contending, among others, that Imelda R. Marcos failed to comply with the one (1) - year residence requirement under the Constitution. An order was issued by the COMELEC disqualifying Imelda and canceling her certificate of candidacy. She filed an Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the "seven months" to "since childhood." It was denied because it was filed out of time. In an en banc resolution, the COMELEC declared her as qualified to run and allowed her proclamation should she win in the election. In another resolution same day, it directed that the proclamation is suspended in the event that she obtained the highest numbers of votes; hence, she went to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Imelda Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of election on May 9, 1995.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court said:

"While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for purposes of election law, residence is synonymous to domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it was the residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

"Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that 'for the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966; Corre, 100, Phil. 321, this Court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's 'permanent' home,' 'a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.' Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of 'the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place' and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

"Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between and domicile in that the residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent is to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent to leave after his purpose is established, it is a residence (Uytengsu v. Republic, Phil. 890).

Thus, it is quite normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.

In Uytengsu v. Republic (supra) the Supreme Court laid this distinction quite clearly:

"There is a difference between domicile and residence.’Residence' is used to indicate a place of abode whether permanent or temporary; 'domicile' denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. A residence is not a domicile, but a domicile can be a residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally the place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessary so since no length of residence without the intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

The mere absence of a person from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change in domicile.

On the matters of Imelda's domicile, the Supreme said:

"Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that 'she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City from childhood up to the time she filed for her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) because became a resident of many places,' flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes."

In the instant case, in its proposition that the petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to the petitioner’s (actual) residence, not her domicile. This contention by the COMELEC ignores the settled jurisprudence on residence in election law, the deliberations of the constitutional commission, and the provisions of Omnibus Code (B.P Blg. 881) which provides that any person who transfers residence to another city, municipality, or country solely by reason of his occupation, profession, employment in public and private service, educational activities, work in military or naval service reservations, service in the army, navy or air force, the constabulary or national police force, or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law shall not be deemed to have lost his original residence.

Article 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any other provision does not fix the domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be understood to be the place where their legal representation is established or where they exercise their principal functions. (41a)
[By: Noel Viray]

Persons and Family

Saturday, September 8, 2018

COMPILED REPORT: Persons and Family Relations

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